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THE LEGITIMATION OF ELECTRONIC 
EAVESDROPPING: THE POLITICS 
OF "LAW AND ORDER" 
Herman Schwartz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
U NTIL recently, the eavesdropping impasse in Congress had con-tinued for so long that it seemed to be a permanent fixture. 
For over thirty years, bills to relax the total ban on wiretapping had 
been unsuccessfully introduced in each session of Congress.1 As 
usual, signs of change came only from the Supreme Court, which in 
1967 began to inch toward approval of limited eavesdropping under 
strict controls.2 Then, quite swiftly, a mating of longstanding 
Southern resentment toward the Court and the more recent popular 
anxiety about lawlessness spawned the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968.3 Title I of this statute authorizes federal 
assistance to state efforts to improve the quality of their law enforce-
ment, substantially as recommended by the Johnson Administration. 
Contrary to the Administration's wishes, however, the legislation 
does not stop there. Congress, led by Senators John McClellan of 
Arkansas and James 0. Eastland of Mississippi, added the probably 
• Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan, 1968-1969; Professor of Law, 
State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B. 1953, LL.B. 1956, Harvard University. 
-Ed. 
The author wishes to thank the many colleagues and others, too numerous to list 
individually, who critically analyzed this manuscript. 
I. The total ban on wiretapping appears in § 605 of the Communications Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 605 (1958); the bills to revise § 605 introduced prior to 1959 are listed in 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 781-1031 (1959). 
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41. 
3. P.L. 90-351 Oune 19, 1968) (hereinafter Act]. This victory was the culmination 
of a long campaign, which included the Valachi hearings before Senator McClellan's 
committee [see Bell, The Myth of the Cosa Nostra, 46 NEW I.EADER Dec. 23, 1963, at 
12, 14] and continuous pressure for legitimation after Senator Edward V. Long's Sub-
committee on Administrative Practices and Procedure exposed the vast amount of il-
legal eavesdropping engaged in by governmental agencies. For examples of such 
pressure, see Graham, Setback ls Noted in Fight on Crime, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1965, 
§ 1, at I, col. 4; Landauer, Bugging Backlash, Wall St. J., March 6, 1967, p. I, col. 1. 
The Long Subcommittee Hearings on Invasions of Privacy by Governmental Agencies 
were held in 1965 and 1966. A detailed and depressing account of the political and 
legislative history of the whole Omnibus Crime Control Act appears in Harris, Annals 
of Legislation-The Turning Point, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 1968, at 68-179; for title 
III in particular, see id. at 152-63. Harris sums up congressional views of the Act as 
follows: "[A]ll those who voted against it, many of those who voted for it, and most 
of those who didn't vote at all [believed] that the bill was a piece of demagoguery 
devised out of malevolence and enacted in hysteria." Id. at 68. 
[ 455] 
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unconstitutional4 provisions of title II which seek to prevent ap-
plication of Miranda v. Arizona5 and United States v. Wade6 in 
federal courts; a shamefully feeble gun control section-title IV-
which has since been superseded;7 a retrogressive title V imposing a 
five-year ban on government employment of anyone convicted of a 
felony in connection with a riot or civil disorder; and of perhaps 
greatest ultimate impact, title III, of dubious constitutionality, which 
authorizes frequent and prolonged eavesdropping by federal and 
state investigators under "controls" which range from the ineffec-
tive to the nonexistent. 8 Despite the questionable nature of these 
measures, congressional reaction to public concern about crime drove 
the entire bill through Congress by ovenvhelming margins. 
Almost simultaneously with the passage of the Crime Control 
Act, the Advisory Committee on the Police Function of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal 
Justice issued a tentative draft which also authorizes electronic eaves-
dropping by federal and state officials. The ABA draft, Standards 
Relating to Electronic Surveillance, and its supporting commen-
taries are quite similar to title III and the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee Report that accompanied it.9 The similarity is hardly sur-
prising; both bills, as well as the ABA commentaries, were prepared 
by Professor G. Robert Blakey of Notre Dame Law School, probably 
the foremost academic spokesman for the legitimation of electronic 
eavesdropping.10 The ABA tentative draft is thus a brief for elec-
4. See Wechsler, Letter to the N.Y. Times, June 16, 1968, § 4, at 17, col. 3. 
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
6. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Act also struck at the Court's decision in Mallory v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), but this attack raised no constitutional issues. 
7. P.L. 90-618 (1968). 
8. Even President Richard M. Nixon has criticized title III because "in some 
respects it failed to define clearly the acceptable limits of the practice." CIVIL LtnEllTIES, 
Oct. 1968, at 10, col. 2. 
Title III contains not only eavesdropping authority but also a little-noted immunity 
provision applying to frtJery offense for which federal officers may use electronic surveil-
lance. This encompasses far more than was contemplated under separate immunity legis-
lation then pending. See S. 677, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Act contains six 
other substantive "anticrime" provisions in addition to those mentioned in the 
text. 
9. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1097]. 
One of the similarities can be seen in a revealing bit of Orwellian "newspeak": in 
both the Senate and ABA reports, the dichotomy constantly referred to is one allegedly 
between "privacy and justice," not between "privacy and law enforcement," as it is 
usually put. Compare PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN• 
ISTRATION OF JUsrICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 203 (1967), with, 
e.g., AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION PROJEcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 13, 21 (1968) [hereinafter ABA 
STANDARDS]. 
10. Professor Blakey was described as "the principal draftsman" of title III [see 
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tronic eavesdropping in general and for much of title III in particu-
lar, and it is useful to examine them together.11 
This Article will examine some constitutional considerations 
raised by wiretapping and eavesdropping in light of recent Supreme 
Court decisions, the probable extent of such activity, the limitations 
imposed upon it by title III and the ABA Standards, and the argu-
ments for the "necessity" of electronic surveillance. Finally, a few 
jaundiced comments will be offered about legislative and judicial 
lawmaking in the field of criminal justice, particularly in a time of 
crisis. 
II. THE NONPARTICULARIZED SEARCH 
A. The Unconstitutional Indiscriminateness of the Intrusion 
Authorized by Title III 
The chief argument against the constitutionality of most kinds 
of eavesdropping12 is that the resulting search and seizure is un-
avoidably too sweeping to comply with the particularity require-
ments of the fourth amendment. When a continuous tap is placed 
on a telephone, the eavesdropper almost inevitably hears all the 
conversations of everyone who talks on that line whether the subject 
calls out from the tapped number, calls in to that number, or is 
called by someone using that phone, and no matter how irrelevant 
or privileged the communication. A bug can be even more intrusive, 
for it can catch every intimate, irrelevant, or privileged utterance 
of each person in the room or area bugged.13 Because these devices 
remarks of Congressman Anderson, 114 CONG. R.Ec. 4633 (1968)] and was on the Senate 
floor during the Senate debate [114 CoNG. R.Ec. 6031 (1968)]. He also served as the re-
porter for the ABA Advisory Committee on the Police Function, and prepared a bill 
similar to title III for President Johnson's Crime Commission. 
A somewhat shorter version of the eighty-six-page General Commentary to the 
ABA Standards, virtually identical in argument, structure, and much of the language, 
was prepared by Professor Blakey and appeared in a brief filed by the National 
District Attorneys' Association in the Berger case. It is reprinted in Hearings Before 
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1055 (1967). 
11. The Standards are of more than academic and background interest. Under 
title III, state eavesdropping requires a specific state statute, and the Standards may 
well be looked to as a model, except where their requirements are less restrictive than 
those of title III. 
12. In this discussion "eavesdropping" will refer to both wiretapping and bugging 
unless otherwise indicated. 
l!l. For example, the Government has admitted that it overheard five conversations 
in which Muhammud Ali (Cassius Clay) participated, "at three places where electronic 
surveillance against others was directed." Supporting Memorandum for the United 
States at 1-2, Clay v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 3056 (U.S. May 6, 1968). For other ex-
amples, see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (conversations throughout 
the house overheard); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (bedroom). See Williams, 
The Wiretapping Problem: A. Defense Counsel's Yjew, 44 MINN. L. R.Ev. 855, 862-68 
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intrude so deeply and so grossly, they discourage people from speak-
ing freely; as Justice Brennan has warned, if these devices prolifer-
ate widely, we may find ourselves in a society where the only sure 
way to guard one's privacy "is to keep one's mouth shut on all 
occasions. "14 
The possibility of such indiscriminate surveillance was one of 
the principal reasons for which the Supreme Court struck down a 
New York eavesdropping statute in Berger v. New Y ork.16 The statute 
at issue in Berger, section 813-a of the New York Code of Criminal 
Procedure, authorized eavesdropping for periods up to sixty days 
on the basis of a sworn statement 
that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime 
may be thus obtained, and particularly describing the person or 
persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to 
be overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof, and ... identi-
fying the particular telephone number or telegraph line involved.16 
An unlimited number of sixty-day extensions were permitted. In 
Berger, eavesdropping had been authorized under this statute for a 
four-month period on the offices of two suspects-one of whom was 
a lawyer-in a state liquor authority bribery case. 
The Supreme Court, stressing that the inherently broad intrusion 
of electronic eavesdropping made the fourth amendment's particu-
larity requirements "especially" important,17 set down constitutional 
requirements to prevent such overbroad intrusions. These require-
ments were drawn largely from the Court's previous discussion of 
the eavesdropping procedures in Osborn v. United States.18 As the 
Court emphasized, the recording device in Osborn was used by a 
party to the conversation who was engaged in the investigation of 
"a specific criminal offense," and the eavesdropping was restricted 
to the "limited purpose outlined in" an antecedent judicial order; 
the type of conversation was described with particularity so that 
(1960). Other arguments based on the fifth amendment and the mere-evidence rule have 
been rejected either impliedly [see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)], or ex-
plicitly [Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 n.2 (1967)]. 
14. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963). See also Kalven, Privacy in the 
Year 2000 in Symposium, Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress, DAEDALUS 876, 
882 (1967): "It may be a final ironic commentary on how badly things will have be-
come by 2000 when some men will make a fortune merely by providing, on a monthly, 
weekly, daily, or even hourly basis, a room of one's own." 
15. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). There were other reasons as well, such as a lack of require-
ments of notice to the victim of the eavesdropping and of a return to the judge of 
what was overheard. 388 U.S. at 58-60. 
16. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (1958). 
17. 388 U.S. at 56. See also 388 U.S. at 68, 69 Gustice Stewart, concurring). 
18. 385 U.S. 323 (1966). 
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"the officer could not search unauthorized areas"; the investigator 
would have to end the intrusion "once the property sought, and for 
which the order was issued, was found." Furthermore, 
the order authorized one limited intrusion rather than a series or 
continuous surveillance .... [A] new order was issued when the 
officer sought to resume the search and probable cause was shown 
for the succeeding one. Moreover, the order was executed by the 
officer with dispatch, not over a prolonged and extended period . 
• • • 19 
Although Osborn involved the recording of a conversation by one 
who was participating in it, which was of course easy to describe 
with particularity in advance, the Berger Court seemed to attach no 
significance to this distinction. Rather, it implied that the proce-
dures used in Osborn should be followed in all cases, even where 
none of the parties had consented to the interception. 
Measured by these standards, the New York statute fell far short: 
to the Court, the statute authorized "general searches by electronic 
devices," in violation of the .Marron rule prohibiting "the seizure of 
one thing under a warrant describing another."20 The statute did 
not require the applicant to describe "the 'property' sought, the 
conversations," with particularity, and this gave the officer "a roving 
commission to 'seize' any and all conversations." Furthermore, autho-
rization for a two-month period was impermissible: 
[Such surveillance] is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, 
searches and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause. 
Prompt execution is also avoided. During such a long and continuous 
(24 hours a day) period the conversations of any and all persons com-
ing into the area covered by the device will be seized indiscriminately 
and without regard to their connection with the crime under investi-
gation .... [T]he statute places no termination date on the eaves-
drop once the conversation sought is seized. This is left entirely to 
the discretion of the officer.21 
In sum, the Court concluded that the New York statute permitted 
"a blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop . . . without adequate 
judicial supervision or protective procedures."22 
The Court's subsequent decision in Katz v. United States under-
scored this concern for particularity by approving, in dictum, an 
extremely narrow intrusion. In Katz, FBI agents had probable 
cause to believe that the defendant was using certain public tele-
19. !188 U.S. at 57. 
20. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), quoted in 388 U.S. at 58. 
21. !188 U.S. at 58-60. 
22. !188 U.S. at 60. 
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phones for gambling purposes about the same time almost every day. 
Thereafter, 
[e]ach day, as petitioner approached a certain spot about a block 
and a half from the telephones, agents in a radio car surveilling 
petitioner signaled other agents near the booths, who then attached 
and activated the recorder and microphones [on two booths]. After 
petitioner departed, the device was removed. . . .2s 
Six recordings were made and used. Of this procedure the Court said: 
[T]his surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly autho-
rized magistrate ... clearly apprised of the precise intrusion ... 
could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, 
the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts 
in fact took place.24 
Purportedly in compliance with the guidelines set out in these 
cases, title III of the Crime Control Act authorizes electronic sur-
veillance for thirty days, with the possibility of an unlimited number 
of thirty-day extensions, if a judge makes an ex parte determination 
that: 
(a) there is probable cause £or belief that an individual is com-
mitting, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense 
enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter; 
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular commu-
nications concerning that offense will be obtained through such 
interception; 
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have 
failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or 
to be too dangerous; 
(d) there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from 
which, or the place where, the wire or oral communications are to 
be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connec-
tion with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed 
in the name of, or commonly used by such person.25 
The ABA Standards contain similar provisions.26 
Under the principles announced in Berger, Katz, and Osborn, 
both title III and the ABA Standards contain serious constitutional 
infirmities with respect to the duration of the eavesdropping and 
the required particularity of the order authorizing it. 
23. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (em• 
phasis added). 
24. 389 U.S. at 354. Because no warrant had been obtained for such surveillance, it 
was ruled illegal despite its compliance with particularity requirements. 389 U.S. at 
358. 
25. Act § 2518(3). 
26. ABA STANDARDS §§ 5.1-5.11. 
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I. Time 
Both title III and the Standards authorize continuous eaves-
dropping for potentially unlimited periods of time. Section 2518(5) 
of the Crime Control Act permits eavesdropping for an initial period 
of thirty days with an unlimited number of thirty-day extensions on 
renewed showings of probable cause. Allowing such lengthy surveil-
lance, possibly for years, conflicts sharply with Berger's clear disap-
proval of the two-month authorization permitted by the New York 
statute.27 Moreover, sections 2518 (l)(d) and 4(e) of the Act do not 
limit the eavesdropping to specific points in time, unlike the court 
orders upheld in Katz and the cases approvingly cited in Berger,28 
but rather allow uninterrupted eavesdropping over a "period of 
time." Under such a provision, officers may install a tap or a bug 
which will be in continuous operation throughout the days or months 
for which the interception is authorized. This would seem to pose a 
rather clear conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Berger, 
which disapproved the uninterrupted interception as allowing "in-
discriminate" seizure and approved the Osborn interception be-
cause "the order authorized one limited intrusion rather than ... 
a continuous surveillance."29 
The legislative history and ABA commentary approve such 
lengthy and continuous eavesdropping for, as the Senate Reports puts 
it, 
27. Section 5.9 of the Standards contains similar authority except that the initial 
period is fifteen days, though the extensions may be for thirty. The Standards add a 
requirement that where such extended overhearing is contemplated, there must be a 
showing that the suspect is engaged "over a period of time in the commission of a 
particular offense with two or more close associates as part of a continuing criminal 
activity." § 5.4(i)(A). Apart from the obvious vagueness of "close associates" and 
"continuing criminal activity," there seems to be no indication in Berger or elsewhere 
that suspects in a three-man conspiracy case involving several criminal acts are en-
titled to fewer constitutional protections than others; Berger itself involved a multi-
person conspiracy. Indeed electronic eavesdropping is supposed to be uniquely valuable 
for such offenses and usually restricted to them. Were the Standards approach adopted 
the exception would become the rule. 
Also, one might ask how much investigators will have to add to the initial showing 
to justify the extension. For an indication that eavesdropping for extended periods of 
time is not uncommon see text accompanying notes 30-31, 65 infra. 
28. 388 U.S. at 63: 
[T]his Court has in the past under specific conditions and circumstances, sus-
tained the use of eavesdropping devices. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 
129 [1942]; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 [1952]; Lopez v. United States, 
supra; and Osborn v. United States, supra. 
29. 388 U.S. at 57. For similar conclusions, see The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 
HARV. L. REv. 63, 195-96 (1968). Cf. Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 
CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 296, 312-13 (1968). The Department of Justice takes a similarly 
narrow view. See 114 CONG. REc. 6216, Comment on Amend. No. 765 (May 23, 1968). 
See also H. Schwartz, Electronic Eavesdropping: What the Supreme Court Did Not Do 
4 CRIM. L. Bou.. 83 (1968). 
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[w]here it is necessary to obtain coverage to [sic] only one meeting, 
the order should not authorize additional surveillance .... Where a 
course of conduct embracing multiple parties and extending over a 
period of time is involved, the order may properly authorize propor-
tionately longer surveillance but in no event longer than 30 days, 
unless extensions are granted.80 
As authority and illustration of the "proportionately longer surveil-
lance" for "conduct extending over a period of time," the Senate 
Report cites People v. Tarantino,31 a case involving fifteen months 
of continuous interception during which "police listened to every 
sound that was made in defendant's [hotel] room ... [although they] 
did not consider all of the conversations they overheard relevant ... "; 
the result was a set of recordings that totalled "approximately 500 
hours of listening time.''32 This example seems inconsistent with 
Berger's condemnation of lengthy, continuous surveillance. The Stan-
dards do additional violence to Berger by citing the eavesdropping 
in that case as an example of the kind of continuous overhearing that 
the ABA Advisory Committee seeks to authorize,33 even though 
Berger itself squarely condemned that surveillance as too lengthy 
and indiscriminate. 34 
A possible limitation on the length of the surveillance might 
result from a requirement that the interception end when a con-
versation of the type sought is first obtained. The Supreme Court 
in Berger criticized the New York statute for failing to prevent a 
police officer, in his untrammeled discretion, from continuing to 
listen even after he had obtained what he was looking for.30 Sec-
tions 2518 (l)(d) and (4)(e) of title III take away the officer's discre-
tion, but still permit continued listening if a judge authorizes it 
upon a showing of "probable cause to believe that additional com-
munications of the same type will appear." Such a limitation is of 
course no limitation at all, for where there is probable cause of a 
continuing offense, almost inevitably there is a probable cause to 
believe that there will be more than one relevant conversation. 
The possibility of a warrant authorizing a number of intercep-
tions may conflict with Berger in yet another respect. There, the 
30. S. REP. No. 1097 at 101. Cf. ABA STANDARDS 148, which uses virtually identical 
language. 
31. 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955). The evidence in Tarantino was excluded, 
however, because it was obtained without prior approval of a magistrate. 
32. 45 Cal. 2d at 593, 290 P.2d at 508. 
33. ABA STANDARDS § 5.9, comment. 
34. 388 U.S. at 57; see text accompanying note 28. 
35. 388 U.S. at 57, 59. 
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Court seemed to require that each order be limited to one intercep-
tion; it disapproved a "series of intrusions, searches and seizures, 
pursuant to a single showing of probable cause."36 The Berger 
Court's implied approval of Osborn, where the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation had obtained a new order for a second interception 
made only a day after the original interception, reinforces this read-
ing.37 Dictum in Katz, however, seems to approve a surveillance in-
volving six different interceptions on several different days.38 This 
particular point was not argued in Katz, and the issue of whether 
one order can authorize several interceptions remains in doubt. But 
even if Katz did supersede Berger in this respect, the "narrowly cir-
cumscribed" surveillance over a period of several days that was ap-
proved in Katz is a far cry from the continuous series of intrusions-
possibly lasting for years-authorized by title III.39 
2. Particularity of the Warrant Description 
Given the possibility of such long-term eavesdropping, Berger's 
requirement that the "property" sought-the conversation-be de-
scribed with particularity in the warrant becomes all the more im-
portant, at least theoretically. The wider the possible temporal or 
spatial area of a permissible search, the more important it is that 
the description of what is sought be precise, for imposing such a 
limitation may be the only way to discourage indiscriminate searches 
of extensive areas. Yet the practical value of such a limitation may 
be rather feeble. Where eavesdropping continues for a long time, a 
particularized description of the conversation in the warrant is not 
likely to limit the intrusion very much, especially since indirect 
use of the evidence is hard to detect.40 In some instances, however, 
the eavesdropping may not be continuous, but rather may be limited 
to a specific described conversation or conversations as in Katz and 
similar cases. Moreover, even if lengthy eavesdropping is statutorily 
permitted, the exclusion of evidence obtained directly or indirectly 
36. 388 U.S. at 59. 
37. This interpretation is further reinforced by the fact that the second interception 
was necessitated solely by the failure of the recording device to operate properly the 
first time, surely a reasonable justification for trying again without seeking a new 
order. 
38. See Brief, supra note 23, at 3-4. 
39. Section 2518(5) of title III may also offend Berger's condemnation of orders 
which are not promptly executed. Cf. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932). The 
thirty-day period apparently need not start promptly, nor within ten days as is required 
with a conventional warrant; rather, execution is to take place "as soon as practica-
ble." See also ABA STANDARDS § 5.9. 
40. See discussion below at text accompanying notes 152-57. 
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from conversations that are not specified in advance might discourage 
some eavesdropping; if less evidence can be used, there may be less 
incentive to listen. Thus, a strictly construed and enforced particu-
larity requirement might provide some limitation, although not 
much optimism on this score is warranted. 
Such a strict particularity requirement could exclude two types 
of nonspecified evidence: undescribed evidence of the crime being 
investigated, and evidence of other crimes.41 Title III does not seem 
to exclude either kind, although the text of the statute is not entirely 
clear. As to the nonspecified evidence of a specified crime, sections 
2518(4)(c) and (e) require a description of the "type of communica-
tion sought to be intercepted." If "type of communication" is con-
strued broadly, as the Standards at least seem to suggest,42 then little 
evidence relating to the offense in question will be excluded. Such 
a broad interpretation may run afoul of Berger, however. There 
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stressed that "the need for 
particularity ... is especially great in the case of eavesdropping."43 
His meaning may be explained by his citation of Osborn, Goldman, 
Lopez, and On Lee as examples of specificity, for, as his discussion in 
the accompanying footnote demonstrates, all four cases involved 
quite detailed advance knowledge and description of the anticipated 
contents of the conversations, of the crime and persons involved, 
and of the place and time of interception.44 The facts and language 
in Katz also point toward such a meticulous construction of the parti-
cularity requirement.45 
41. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), for an example of the 
first kind, and Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 825 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 
U.S. 897 (1966) for an example of the second. 
42. The Standards require only "a specification of the particular offense ••• under 
investigation," ABA STANDARDS § 5.3(iii). This is elaborated in the commentary by 
"that is, the type of conversation to be intercepted." Id. at 137. This identification 
is contrary to the requirements of Berger: specification of both the offense and the 
communication (388 U.S. at 58-59), the same requirements found in § 2518(4)(c) of 
title III. 
43. 388 U.S. at 56. 
44. In Osborn, in which James Hoffa's lawyer was convicted of attempted jury-
tampering, the eavesdropping consisted of an informer's secret recording of his own 
planned conversation with the suspect. This was also true in Lopez, another case cited in 
Berger. In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), an informer wore a radio 
transmitter to broadcast his conversations with a specific suspect. And in Goldman v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), also cited, the FBI's detectaphone was installed in 
order to overhear four conversations to which an FBI informer was a party, and which 
may actually have been set up by him. 
At one point, Berger does refer to "type of conversation," 388 U.S. at 57, but this 
is in a discussion of the very specific and limited set of circumstances in Osborn. 
45. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925), cited by the ABA as authority for 
very broad specification (ABA STANDARDS 90 n.256), is a rather special case. A prohibi-
tion agent saw some cases stencilled "whiskey" being loaded into a building and he 
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Title III offers little direct guidance as to how broadly "type of 
communication" should be interpreted, except that apparently the 
description must include more than a reference to the particular 
offense, since this is separately required by section 2518(l)(b). Even 
if it is read narrowly, however, the statute would still allow the police 
to listen for all conversations that fit the description of the type speci-
fied in the order, under the sections discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, and this seems to be less than the kind of particularity 
that is impliedly required by Berger and Katz. 
Moreover, if one may judge from the latitude allowed police 
officers with respect to conversations about nonspecified offenses, it 
is unlikely that a narrow construction of "type of communication" 
was intended. Section 2517(5) expressly permits retroactive judicial 
ratification of the seizure of evidence of other offenses if the evidence 
was obtained by a legal interception, which completely ignores the 
thrust of the Supreme Court's holding in Marron prohibiting "sei-
zure of one thing under a warrant describing another."46 Instead of 
the more meticulous particularity for electronic eavesdropping that 
is required by Berger, the Crime Control Act demands less particu-
larity than is usually imposed to secure the conventional warrant. 
Title III is not of course unique in ignoring Marron. Despite 
the Supreme Court's invocation of the case in Berger and elsewhere, 
the lower courts have largely disregarded it.47 They have been reluc-
tant to force officers to obtain a new and separate warrant in order 
to seize unanticipated items seen in the course of a legitimate entry 
and search. This is not entirely unreasonable if the initial intrusion 
is proper. After all, the invasion of privacy has already occurred, and 
legitimately, so why exclude any items seized as a result? Though 
this argument may sound superficially plausible, it ignores the most 
obtained a warrant for "cases of whiskey.'' When a large seizure was made under the 
warrant, the Court easily found that the specificity was adequate. Given the nature 
of the commodity-fungible cases of whiskey-it is difficult to see how more specificity 
was physically possible. This is a far cry from specifying conversations which vary 
sharply as among different people, times, and subject matter, inter alia. 
There is also some question whether the "especially great" particularity which is 
required where electronic eavesdropping is concerned (388 U.S. at 56) does not in-
dependently make Steele inapplicable, even if that case were generally more apposite, 
especially in view of the threat to free speech from electronic surveillance; cf. Stanford 
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (more particularity required where first amendment 
implicated in seizure); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. at 469-71 Gustice Brennan 
dissenting). See text accompanying notes 80·81. 
46. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), is cited in Berger, 388 U.S. at 58. 
47. See, e.g., United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962); Johnson v. United 
States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Contra, United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775 
(E.D. Tenn. 1961). 
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important rationale for the Marron rule: curtailing intrusive conduct 
by reducing the incentive for an extension of such conduct. Were 
the Marron limitation abolished, all searches and seizures would 
verge on the general, so long as the initial entry was legitimate; there 
would be no reason to stop the search, even after the described item 
was seized, since everything else that was found could be used in a 
subsequent prosecution. 
3. Eavesdropping on Privileged Communications 
To illustrate further the indiscriminately broad sweep of the elec-
tronic surveillance now permitted, it might be well at this point to 
discuss one of its more serious consequences: the interception of 
privileged conversations. Professor Alan Westin's conclusion that 
eavesdropping on lawyers is a "widespread practice"48 is partly con-
firmed by the fact that many of the electronic eavesdropping cases 
that have been litigated involve eavesdropping on defense attorneys, 
and by the many reports of advertent and inadvertent intrusions on 
the communications of lawyers, doctors, and others.49 Even where 
the police do not intend to eavesdrop on privileged conversations, it 
will often be impossible to monitor out such communications;50 and 
it is really asking too much of human nature to expect that police 
officers who are trying to put a suspect behind bars will refrain from 
listening in on his efforts to frustrate them.51 
Title III reflects virtually no awareness of this problem,52 but 
the ABA Advisory Committee professes some concern and imposes 
limitations. The Standards prohibit eavesdropping on 
48. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 125 (1967). 
49. United States v. Roberts, 389 U.S. 18 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 
(1967); O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 
U.S. 323 (1966); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966): United States v. Goldman, 
316 U.S. 129 (1942); People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 286 N.Y.S.2d 657, 233 N.E.2d 
705 (1967): United States v. Coplon, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
The widespread use of such surveillance in abortion investigations [see, e.g., People 
v. Scharfstein, 52 Misc. 2d 976, 277 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1967); People v. Cohen, 248 N.Y.S.2d 
339 (1964); People v. Scardaccione, 243 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1963)] often produces eaves• 
dropping on physician-patient conversations. 
50. Hearings on S. Res. 190 Before Subcomm. on Administrative Practices and 
Procedures of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 170-74 
(1967) [hereinafter 1967 Long Committee Hearings] (testimony of Geoffrey Arn). 
51. See cases cited in note 49 supra; United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
But see People v. Morhouse (Sup. Ct. N.Y., Nov. 11, 1968), in N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 
1968, at 1, col. 2, where it was found that police refrained from listening, following 
remand for hearing on this point in People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 233 N.E.2d 705, 
286 N .Y .S.2d 657 (1967). 
52. The sole consideration appears in § 2517(4) which maintains the privilege of 
any otherwise privileged communications. 
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a facility or in a place primarily used by licensed physicians, li-
censed lawyers, or practicing clergymen or in a place used primarily 
for habitation by husband and wife unless an additional showing 
... is made ... that-
(i) the overhearing or recording will be or was made in such 
manner so as to eliminate or minimize insofar as practicable the 
overhearing or recording of other communications whose over-
hearing or recording are not or would not be authorized and 
(ii) there is or was a special need for overhearing or record-
ing of the communications over the facilities.63 
This limitation, which also applies to eavesdropping on public 
facilities such as telephones, is a verbal placebo. The "additional 
showing" requirement adds little: minimizing the chances of inter-
cepting "innocent" calls should, one would think, be required in 
all interceptions, as indeed it is in the Crime Control Act.154 Further-
more, according to the only example given in the Standards,65 the 
"special need" test is apparently satisfied simply by a showing that the 
facility in question and not another is being used for illegal purposes; 
again, one would expect this to be a requirement for all interceptions. 
We are assured that this Standard must be "scrupulously met."56 
Does this imply that the other Standards need not be? And what is 
"scrupulous compliance" in contrast to less than "scrupulous" com-
pliance? 
There are alternative approaches to this problem. Could we not 
try to exclude entirely such privileged areas and communications 
from legalized eavesdropping? If these privileges are indeed crucial to 
the high purposes for which they were created-especially the consti-
tutionally hallowed and ancient attorney-client relationship57-then 
legislation that is as experimental as the Crime Control Act and the 
Standards purport to be58 need not include them among the possible 
areas of interception. If we cannot prove the over-all benefit of eaves-
53. ABA STANDARDS §§ 5.ll(a), 5.10, respectively (combined to incorporate a cross 
reference in § 5.11). 
54. Act § 2518(5): "Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision 
that the authorization to intercept shall be e.xecuted as soon as practicable, shall be 
conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not 
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter ••.. " 
55. ABA STANDARDS § 5.10, comment: "Second, a special need to tap the phone 
must be shown. For example, where a professional gambler is conducting his business 
not over his private phone, but over a particular public phone, there exists a special 
need to make interceptions over that phone." 
56. Id. § 511, comment b. 
57. In addition to this obvious example, it is worth noting that priest-penitent 
surveillance might raise first amendment problems. 
58. See ABA STANDARDS 51-52; S. REP. No. 1097, at 107. 
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dropping without trying it, perhaps we should not authorize so 
serious and probable an invasion of privacy until at least some of 
the evidence is in. 59 
Another possible method of reducing intrusion upon attorney-
client communications is to prohibit post-indictment eavesdrop-
ping. The Standards expressly permit this kind of surveillance 
and title III is silent on this point, thereby not proscribing it. Yet 
once a man has been indicted, experience shows that there is a good 
chance that electronic eavesdropping on him will result in the inter-
ception of attorney-client discussions60 or other conversations relating 
to his defense.61 Indeed, Jl.1.assiah v. United States,62 however narrowly 
it is read, seems to prohibit this kind of post-indictment inves-
tigation when it relates to the particular offense under indictment. 
Eavesdropping on matters already under indictment, especially in 
cases in which information relating to the defense cannot practicably 
be eliminated, would seem to be as much an interference with the 
right to counsel as surreptitious interrogation of the defendant, and 
it should be subject to the same post-indictment prohibition. Such a 
ban might, if enforced, prevent at least some invasions of attorney-
client conferences. 
4. "Strategic Intelligence" and Specific Crimes 
The fact that neither title III nor the Standards meet some of 
the fundamental restrictions imposed by Berger and Katz is not 
altogether surprising, for adherence to these limitations would seri-
ously reduce the allegedly unique value of electronic surveillance: 
its ability to obtain "strategic intelligence" for the war against 
organized crime. Yet the Act's own restriction of electronic sur-
veillance to the investigation of one of the specific offenses listed 
in section 2516 which "has been, is being, or is about to be com-
mitted" also severely reduces its usefulness in obtaining such "stra-
tegic intelligence." Since this restriction is clear and cannot be easily 
evaded by verbal manipulation, title III will turn out to be either 
a provision of relatively little value in the struggle against organized 
crime or a verbal smoke screen for continuing illegality. 
According to its proponents, the special advantage of electronic 
surveillance is that it is a valuable tool for gathering strategic intelli-
59. For some penetrating comments on action based on ignorance see Lehman, 
Crime, the Public and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review of the Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1487 (1968). See also part III infra. 
60. See cases cited in note 49 supra. 
61. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 402 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1968). 
62. 377 U.S. 201 (1964); see also Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45 (1967). 
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gence about organized crime and that it thus enables law enforce-
ment officials to obtain "a look at the overall picture" for "preven-
tion" purposes.63 The techniques of fighting organized crime differ 
from those used in ordinary criminal investigation. The former 
involves accumulating a great deal of superficially irrelevant in-
formation which is then collated. Furthermore, in investigating 
organized crime the police do not work from a known crime to an 
unknown or suspected criminal, but "backwards," from a "known 
criminal" to a hoped-for discovery of an as-yet-unknown crime. 64 
As Professor Blakey testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee: 
The normal criminal situation deals with an incident, a mur-
der, a rape, or a robbery, probably committed by one person. The 
criminal investigation normally moves from the known crime toward 
the unknown criminal. This is in sharp contrast to the type of pro-
cedures you must use in the investigation of organized crime. Here 
in many situations you have known criminals but unknown crimes. 
So it is necessary to subject the known criminals to surveillance, 
that is, to monitor their activities. It is necessary to identify their 
criminal and noncriminal associates; it is necessary to identify their 
areas of operation, both legal and illegal. Strategic intelligence at-
tempts to paint this broad, overall picture of the criminal's activi-
ties in order that an investigator can ultimately move in with a 
specific criminal investigation and prosecution. . . . Perhaps the 
best illustration I can give you is the "airtels", ... [which] represent 
the gathering of strategic intelligence against organized crime in 
that case against Raymond Patriarca. 
Tactical intelligence, on the other hand, is illustrated by the 
Osborn case, which the Supreme Court heavily relied upon in the 
Berger opinion. You moved in there and monitored only one con-
versation or only one meeting. You had a limited, tactical purpose, 
whereas in the Patriarca situation you had a broader purpose .... So 
the distinction deals, first, with the purpose of the agency and then 
perhaps, second, with the extent of time the subject is under sur-
veillance.65 
63. Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A 
Preliminary Analysis, app. C to PRESIDENT'S COMMlSSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 80, 92 (1967) 
(hereinafter TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME]. 
64. See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (surveillance of 
Fred Black, as explained by FBI agents). 
65. Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 957-58 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Senate Crime Hearings] (testimony 
of Prof. G. Robert Blakey). 
An example of an "intelligence investigation" appears in the testimony dealing with 
electronic surveillance given by Dean Elson, Special Agent in Charge of the Las Vegas 
Field Office of the FBI in Transcript of Testimony at 749, United States v. Drew, Cr. 
No. 1333 (D. Nev., Feb. 1968): 
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Strategic information does not, of course, come immediately: the 
Patriarca "airtels" cover more than three years; the Berger bug was 
in operation for four months; in one of the Hoffa cases, surveil-
lance of a codefendant lasted eighteen months, including six months 
after indictment; 66 in the California case of People v. Tarantino, 
which was cited with apparent approval by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in its report on title III, the interception continued 
for fifteen months; and the eavesdropping which intercepted boxing 
champion Muhammed Ali's conversation while he was being inves-
tigated for draft evasion also lasted some fifteen months.67 Thus, the 
time limitations of Katz and Berger seem quite inconsistent with 
this particular use of electronic surveillance. 
Moreover, a vast number of people will inevitably be overheard 
while the police are gathering strategic intelligence, and a substantial 
number of these people will be overheard often. Many of these indi-
viduals will not be involved in criminality, but since organized 
crime investigations usually involve the possible corruption of 
respected community figures, suspicion will arise and their conversa-
tions will be intercepted. As noted above, the proponents of stra-
tegic intelligence claim that it is necessary to identify "criminal and 
noncriminal associates ... [ and] their areas of operation, both legal 
and illegal."68 
Q. • .. [D]o you want to explain really what you mean by that, and [sic] 
intelligence type investigation? 
A. We were interested in Mr. Drew from the standpoint of his activities, his 
associates, who he was contacting in connection with organized crime and or• 
ganized criminal activity. Our primary objective in the investigation was intelli-
gence information just as it is in an espionage investigation. 
There was no-at this stage of the investigation there is no violation within 
the jurisdiction of the Bureau. It was purely an intelligence type of an investiga-
tion. [Emphasis added.] 
Another example was given by New York District Attorney Frank S. Hogan: "We make it 
a habit to keep track of these [notorious gangster] characters who return [from prison] 
and surveillance, including wiretapping of Dio was undertaken, since he seemed to be 
blossoming forth as a power in a number of labor unions." Hearings on Wiretapping 
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 321 
(1955) [hereinafter 1955 House Hearings]. 
On the widespread use of general surveillance eavesdropping, see Hearings on 
S. 1086 on Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Legislation Before the Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 463 
(1961) [hereinafter 1961 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Anthony Savarese); S. DASH, 
R. KNOWLTON, & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS 66, 163-65 (1959); cf. Report on 
Certain Alleged Practices of the F.B.I., IO LAw. GUILD REv. 185, 187-89 (1950). 
66. Hoffa v. United States, 402 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1968). 
67. Supplemental Memorandum for the United States at 1-2, Clay v. United States, 
37 U.S.L.W. 3056 (May 6, 1968). 
68. 1967 Senate Crime Hearings 957 (emphasis added). See the testimony of Special 
Agent Pennypacker of the FBI in Transcript of Proceedings at 610, United States v. 
Black, Cr. Nos. 551-63, 650-63 (D.D.C., Dec. 18, 1967): 
During the course of the investigation I might send a lead out to an office and 
make reference to the fact previously it had been determined from several sources. 
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Such broad-ranging surveillance is facilitated by section 2518(3)(d) 
of title III, which authorizes eavesdropping on facilities and places 
"leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by" the suspect, 
and not merely on those facilities and places that are used primarily 
by him. Thus, eavesdropping on the homes, offices, and telephone 
communications of the suspect's relatives, friends, business partners, 
and others is permitted, and Berger's implied disapproval of eaves-
dropping on people "without regard to their connection with the 
crime under investigation"69 is also ignored. 
The fact is that searches for strategic intelligence, without a 
specific crime as the objective, cannot be squared with Berger, 
Katz, and Osborn. Judging by the language used by the Court, 
the facts at issue in those cases, and the kinds of permissible elec-
tronic surveillance cited in the various opinions, it would seem that 
gathering tactical intelligence is the only kind of surveillance that 
is justifiable under present theories of the fourth amendment. And 
in this respect, both title III and the Standards are verbally con-
sistent with the cases in limiting eavesdropping to such tactical 
intelligence purposes: under sections 2518(l)(b)(i) and 2518(3)(a) 
of the Act, the applicant for an order must provide "details as to [a] 
particular offense" listed in section 2516, while section 5.3(iii) of 
the Standards requires "a specification of the particular offense 
which is or was under investigation." 
This is surely an odd result, for if the war against organized 
crime-the justification for title III-really requires strategic intel-
ligence, how will that war be advanced by legislation which seems 
to permit the acquisition of only tactical intelligence? And if the 
Act does not grant law enforcement officers the power to obtain 
allegedly crucial strategic information, will we not again experience 
the same kind of widespread fl.outing of clear legal limitations that 
has recently come to light?70 In sum, even the very loose title III is 
too restrictive to accomplish the purposes advanced by its propo-
nents, and this raises serious questions about the reasons for their 
One of the sources would be microphone surveillance, that a given named indi-
vidual had been associated with Mr. Black, because this was my area of investiga-
tion, to determine who this individual was. Consequently the source of my 
information to determine who this individual was would be from several sources 
including this microphone surveillance, and it would become commingled 
with other information. My purpose in sending leads out in the first place would 
be to identify individuals which I had no identity for or I wanted to get addi-
tional background and we had a large number of people we had not identified 
up to that point, so it would be a situation where I would be anxious and 
interested. 
69. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967). 
70. See 1965 Long Committee Hearings 1212; text accompanying note ll0 infra. 
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support of the legislation, and about how meaningful they expect 
its ostensible limitations to be. 
B. The Response to the Charge of Unconstitutional Generality 
The legislative history of title III does not devote much space to 
constitutional objections based on the theory that the statute allows 
excessively long and indiscriminately general searches. Rather, it 
simply claims compliance with Berger and Katz throughout.71 The 
ABA Advisory Committee adopts a similar approach in some areas, 
but it tries to meet the issue of indiscriminate searches more directly. 
The response given by the Committee seems to come down to these 
propositions: (1) The claim that a search by electronic eavesdropping 
is especially indiscriminate ignores existing practice in more conven-
tional searches for letters and other tangibles; such searches are (or 
can be) just as indiscriminate, and yet they are legal. (2) Such breadth 
is not repugnant to the Constitution, for the search may be general so 
long as the seizure is specific. "All searches are general. Only seizures 
are definite."72 (3) As Justice Harlan suggests in his dissent to Berger, 
"conversations are not 'seized' either by eavesdropping alone or by 
their recording .... Just as some exercise of dominion, beyond mere 
perception, is necessary for the seizure of tangibles, some use of the 
conversations beyond the initial listening process is required for 
[seizure of] the spoken word."73 (4) The Harlan dissent is also correct 
in contending that specification in the warrant of the "category" of 
conversation is sufficient particularity-"The materials to be seized 
are ... described with sufficient particularity if the warrant readily 
permits their identification both by those entrusted with the warrant's 
execution and by the court in any judicial proceeding."74 (5) Econom-
ic regulation cases show the acceptance of very broadly drawn war-
rants, as do other precedents. 
Some of the problems with the fourth proposition have already 
been considered in the analysis of the meaning of "type of communi-
cation."75 It is necessary to add only that identification hardly seems 
to be the sole purpose of the description, at least where the property 
seized, as opposed to the premises searched, is concerned.76 Indeed, 
71. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097 at 75, 97, 101, 102, 103, 105. 
72. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 434 (testimony of Prof. G. Robert Blakey). 
73. ABA STANDARDS 90 (quoting from 388 U.S. at 98). 
74. Id. at 89, 99, citing Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504 (1925), discussed 
in note 45 supra. 
75. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra. 
76. Indeed, Justice Harlan notes (388 U.S. at 99) that his authority for the criterion 
of sufficient particularity is derived from the discussion of the description of the 
premises in Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498,503 (1925). 
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a very broad description of the property to be seized is not necessarily 
ambiguous; its very breadth may reduce any ambiguity by sweeping 
in a great deal. Rather, the particularity requirement, when tied to 
the predicate of probable cause, is designed to ensure that the police 
know what they are looking for, that they have reason to expect it 
to be where they are looking, and that they seek and seize nothing 
else.77 Thus, the description in the Berger order permitting the re-
cording of "any and all conversations, communications and discus-
sions" taking place in a suspect's office for sixty days seems inade-
quately particularized, even if the warrant, which Justice Harlan 
approved in Berger, makes it plain that the police can seize only 
those conversations "relative to the payment of unlawful fees to 
obtain liquor licenses."78 Such a statement says nothing about the 
conversation but only describes the offense; thus the warrant seems 
very much like the old English general warrant which allowed gen-
eral searches for "goods imported to the Colonies in violation of the 
tax laws of the Crown."79 
Justice Harlan also explicitly dismisses any analogy between the 
kind of eavesdropping that was at issue in Berger and the rationale 
of Stanford v. Texas,80 which required more scrupulous exactitude 
in the warrant where confiscation of books was concerned because of 
the first amendment implications of such a seizure. Yet, without ex-
pressly mentioning Stanford in this context, the majority in Berger 
did state that "the need for particularity ... is especially great in the 
case of eavesdropping,"81 thus impliedly rejecting Justice Harlan's 
refusal to require an unusually high standard here. 
Propositions nvo and three, which are clearly necessary to the 
argument, also seem untenable. The second contention, that searches 
may be general so long as seizures are specific, conflicts with the ABA 
Advisory Committee's own statement elsewhere that it was "the hated 
general searches"82 which the fourth amendment was designed to 
77. See United States v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ("[T]he 
particularity requirement governs police conduct after the police have entered the 
individual's zone of privacy ••. [and] prevents a general exploratory search by limit• 
ing the officers' authority to search and seize."). 
78. !188 U.S. at 99, 100. 
79. Id. at 58. This type of warrant was condemned in Berger. See also Alioto v. 
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48, 49 (E.D. Wis. 196!1) (warrant authorizing seizure of 
"books and records" of certain businesses which were "harbored and concealed from 
examination of the Internal Revenue Service ••• and which are instrumentalities of 
crime" held to be too general). 
80. !179 U.S. 476, 485 (1965), cited in !188 U.S. at 98; see disscussion in note 45 supra. 
81. !188 U.S. at 56. 
82. ABA STANDARDS § 5.6, comment c (emphasis added). 
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prevent; and numerous decisions, including Berger itself,83 stress the 
offensiveness of the search whether or not anything at all is seized. 
The sole exception to this quite uniform condemnation appears in 
cases involving a search incident to arrest, such as Harris v. United 
States84 and United States v. Rabinowitz,B5 where the permitted 
search for evidence of illegality was practically unlimited.B6 The 
anomaly of permitting such expansive powers where there is no war-
rant, while imposing strict limits of particularity on searches made 
under a warrant, has often been noted.87 What is important here, 
however, is the fact that the broad scope of searches incident to arrest 
has not been extended to searches under a warrant, whatever the 
anomaly. Moreover, the Court's recent "stop and frisk" decisions, 
which allow a limited self-protective search by a police officer who 
has reason to believe that he or others are in danger during a police-
citizen encounter, stressed the importance of limiting the scope of 
the search by the purposes for which the search was allowed.BS 
The third proposition-that merely "listening and recording" 
is not a seizure-is inconsistent not only with the clear tenor of Berger, 
but also with the even clearer language of Katz. The majority in 
Berger stressed that the purpose of the fourth amendment is "to keep 
the state out of constitutionally protected areas";89 moreover, its 
reference to "the use of seized conversations" similarly implies that 
conversations are seized before being used. Katz clinched this by 
flatly stating that "[t]he government's activities in electronically 
"listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy 
upon which he justifiably relied ... and thus constituted a search 
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."90 
The Harlan position on this issue must of course be accepted if 
the specificity requirement is to be successfully evaded while retain-
ing the ban on general searches. Justice Harlan pointed this out 
himself in a passage in Berger that shows the inherent vice of elec-
tronic eavesdropping: 
83. 388 U.S. at 58. 
84. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
85. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
86. The sole criterion laid down by these cases is "reasonableness" with little 
guidance on the criteria for a finding of "reasonableness." For reliance on Harris in a 
related context see ABA STANDARDS § 5.6, comment c. 
87. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 197-98 (1947) CTustice Jackson, dissenting); 
Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U. L.Q. 261; 
Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure: A Second Class Constitu-
tional Right?, 25 !ND. L.J. 259, 289-306 (1950). 
88. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), citing in this connection the description of the 
specificity of the search in United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 (1967). 
89. 388 U.S. at 59. 
90. 389 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added). 
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If listening alone completes a "seizure," it would be virtually im-
possible for state authorities at a probable cause hearing to describe 
with particularity the seizures which would later be made during 
extended eavesdropping; correspondingly, seizures would unavoid-
ably be made which lacked any sufficient nexus with the offenses 
for which the order was first issued. Cf. Kremen v. United States, 
353 U.S. 346 (1957); Warden v. Hayden 387 U.S. 294.91 
The Kremen case, where government agents seized the entire con-
tents of a house-including toiletries, Christmas cards, violin strings, 
and pipe cleaners-is precisely in point for this kind of seizure; an 
electronic interception maintained for any length of time seizes 
everything that is uttered in the place that is bugged or over the tele-
phone line that is tapped, with as little discrimination as the agents 
showed in Kremen.92 The Harlan-ABA approach to "seizure," ap-
parently abandoned by Justice Harlan in Katz after it was flatly 
rejected by the majority,93 is incompatible with any meaningful right 
of privacy. One whose intimate conversations with his wife are over-
heard is outraged not primarily because these conversations may be 
recorded or used against him in court, but simply because they are 
overheard.94 Whatever its psychological sources, the desire to be free 
from intrusion exists regardless of how the fruits of the intrusion 
are later used. Conversely, the voyeuristic impulse exists for its own 
sake and demands immediate gratification independent of the pur-
pose of acquiring a record to be used later. 
It is true that most nontestimonial tangible evidence-narcotics, 
policy slips, and weapons-is seized not by mere perception but 
rather by being taken from the possessor's dominion. But different 
principles apply to testimonial communications like conversations 
and letters. Privacy is invaded at the point when the information in 
such media is obtained by one not entitled to it, and this can easily 
be by aural or visual perception. This much, at least, seems implied 
91. 388 U.S. at 97-98. 
92. Arguably, the government agents could refrain from listening to irrelevant or 
privileged conversations, see People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66, 233 N.E.2d 705, 286 
N.Y.S.2d 657 (1967) and United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 n.15 (1967). But in 
organized crime investigations, where electronic eavesdropping is used in order to 
obtain an "over-all picture," it is difficult to know what is irrelevant, especially where 
the conversation is in a code. In any event, one must hear the entire conversation 
before deciding [cf. People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955)] and 
this hearing invades privacy. See text accompanying note 94 infra. 
93. See 389 U.S. at 351-54. 
94. See McDaniel v. Atlantic Coca Cola Bottling Co., Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810, 
816 (1939); Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958). See also cases 
collected in Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389-92 (1960). For a careful 
analysis of this issue, see Josephson, Book Review, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1586 (1968). 
The review also contains an illuminating exploration of many other basic issues in the 
privacy area. 
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by the quite far-reaching declaration in Katz that "the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person . . . seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may 
be constitutionally protected."95 Where privacy is invaded by seeing 
or listening, the search and seizure are identical and simultaneous, 
and the Court has recognized this principle ever since it abandoned 
the Olmstead theory that only tangibles are protected by the fourth 
amendment. When someone wrongly intrudes and perceives some-
thing that the victim does not want disseminated, privacy is invaded 
without more.96 
As to the fifth proposition and its reliance on the economic 
regulation cases, these precedents are not especially pertinent: all 
involve corporations or associations, and the fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights of such entities have always been less than those of 
natural persons.97 Furthermore, the economic regulation cases do not 
involve warrants but subpoenas, which give the party an opportunity 
to challenge the search before it is made. Thus, whatever limita-
tions do exist can be effectively enforced, and there may be a trade-
off between the scope of the protection and its enforceability. 
For these and other reasons, the following example given by the 
ABA Advisory Committee to support the proposition that electronic 
surveillance is not an indiscriminate search hardly seems persuasive: 
Suppose, for example, a search warrant were issued for all copies 
of a certain multi-copy letter or document thought to be located in 
a specified building. To find all copies of the letter or document, 
the officer executing the search warrant would have to examine every 
piece of paper on the premises which might reasonably be the speci-
fied letter or document. No piece of paper on the premises that 
might reasonably be the specified letter or document could go unex-
amined or unread, no matter who wrote it or however innocent, 
privileged or intimate its contents. Depending on the scope of the 
files, this might entail going over correspondence covering several 
years in time. Only after all are initially "searched" would it be pos-
sible to make the ultimately discriminate "seizures" which were 
constitutionally authorized by warrant.98 
For one thing, this hardly seems like a typical case: police do not 
usually go hunting for all copies of one letter. Moreover, it is dif-
95. 389 U.S. at 351-52. 
96. Cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), in which use of electronically inter-
cepted conversations in court was not prohibited but the interception itself was found 
to be a violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. In Katz, the Court referred 
to "listening and recording" (389 U.S. at 353) (emphasis added), but it is hard to believe 
that the recording was essential to the seizure. 
97. See Reynard, supra note 87, at 286-89. 
98. ABA STANDARDS 89. 
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ficult to believe that such wholesale rummaging would be upheld. 
As noted, the Court's recent decision in Terry reflected much con-
cern over the permissible limits of a search, and in light of this con-
cern, it is difficult to believe that the Court would permit the whole-
sale intrusion that the example entails. Kremen, discussed above, 
also implies such a prohibition. Furthermore, why does the example 
assume that it is necessary to read all the way through every piece of 
paper to find the specified document? Once the relevant document 
is identified, it should be easy for the officer to avoid reading even 
a part of the other papers.99 Finally, it is questionable whether even 
under Warden v. Hayden the police can read all of such documents, 
for in some cases the paper may be "testimonial" and possibly pro-
tected.100 
Here, too, the Harris case may cut the other way, since it allowed 
a substantial amount of rummaging in a search incident to an 
arrest-not unlike the kind of search described in the ABA illus-
tration. But for the reasons discussed earlier, Harris, which allowed 
a general search for unspecified evidence, seems a dubious precedent 
for a search warrant situation in which the importance of an espe-
cially high standard of particularity has just been asserted.101 
III. THE ANTICIPATED EXTENT OF LEGALIZED EAVESDROPPING 
A. The Extent of Eavesdropping Prior to Title III 
The eavesdropping authorized by title III will be not only indis-
criminate in character but also frequent in incidence. Its much-
proclaimed almost magical potency102 alone would lead one to 
expect that the police will want to use it regularly. Nevertheless, 
we are assured that despite its great value, eavesdropping has been 
and will be rarely used,103 and that strict judicial supervision will 
ensure such restraint. Unfortunately, neither past experience nor 
future probabilities justify much hope here, whether the restraint 
is enforced internally or externally. 
That electronic eavesdropping has been widespread--even when 
99. This could apply to listening as well as reading, except that the combina-
tion of a lack of limiting specification in the authorization (see part II.A. supra) and 
the desire to learn everything about the suspect, both peculiarly relevant to electronic 
eavesdropping, will deter such self-discipline. See note 92 supra. 
100. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Fortas concurring). 
101. See text accompanying notes 83-88. 
102. Frank S. Hogan frequently refers to electronic surveillance as "the single most 
valuable weapon in fighting organized crime." See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2813 and S. 1195 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1962). 
103. ABA STANDAIIDS 45-47. 
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unmistakably illegal-has often been verified; the hearings of Sena-
tor Edward V. Long's Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure and Professor Alan Westin's study104 are only 
the most recent examples. Instances of abuse in the practice of 
electronic surveillance have included eavesdropping directed against 
those suspected of minor offenses,105 civil rights activists,106 and sus-
pected subversives.107 The use of either phony or patently inade-
quate affidavits has also been common.108 Recently, Internal Revenue 
Service Commissioner Sheldon Cohen admitted that IRS agents had 
knowingly violated the law in organized crime investigations,1°0 and 
that the IRS had actually run a school for eavesdropping.110 Such 
illegalities, as well as others committed by the FBI, have jeopardized 
numerous convictions.111 Many of these cases involved eavesdropping 
on attorney-client conferences and other defense-related activities, 
notably in conference rooms provided by the IRS;112 bugs have also 
been placed in the offices of lawyers whose only suspected offense 
was that their clients were under investigation.113 In one extreme 
104. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). For an earlier extensive report see S. DASH, R. 
KNOWLTON, & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959). 
105. See remarks of Justice Hofstadter, In re Interception of Telephone Com-
munications, 207 Misc. 69, 136 N.Y .S.2d 612, 613 (Sup. Ct. 1955). One survey found 
that 30% of the police departments polled used eavesdropping "whenever possible"; 
in all 80% made some use of it. ';['his was true for communities of all types and sizes. 
The New York City police use it primarily for small-time gambling and prostitution. 
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM [hereinafter PRIVACY AND FREEDOM] 127-28. See also 
1967 Long Committee Hearings 261 (testimony of Vincent Piersante). 
106. Baton-Rouge State Times, Oct. 23, 1961, at 1, col. 3. 
107. These have included eavesdropping on the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs and others; 
see Theoharis & Meyer, The "National Security" Justification for Electronic Eaves-
dropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 749, 760-62, especially 762 n.66, 
and 768 n.100 (1968). 
108. See In re Interception of Telephone Communications, 207 Misc. 69, 136 
N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (Sup. Ct. 1955); S. DASH, R. KNOWLTON & R. SCHWARTZ, THE 
EAVESDROPPERS 56 (1959); note 142 infra. 
109. Kenworthy, Tax Chief Admits 8-year Bugging, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1967, at 
26, col. l; Officials Concede U.S. Revenue Men Used Wiretapping, N.Y. Times, July 
14, 1965, at 1, col. 3. Yet in 1964, the Internal Revenue Service flatly denied that it 
did any wiretapping and issued directives against it. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 122-23; 
1965 Long Committee Hearings 1198-99. The FBI was also caught lying about the 
number and types of eavesdropping it engaged in, particularly in its oft-repeated claim 
that FBI wiretapping was limited to national security cases. Compare PRIVACY AND FREE-
DOM 119-21 with Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 62 on Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and 
the Bill of Rights Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 1481-82 (1959) (letters of former 
Attorney General William P. Rogers), 1961 Senate Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 
(1961) (testimony of former Assistant Attorney General Herbert Miller). 
110. 1965 Long Committee Hearings 1212. 
111. The figure has been estimated to be as high as sixty. Theoharis & Meyer, 
supra note 107, at 766 n.90. 
112. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 122. 
113. Lawyer's Office Bugged by FBI, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1966, § 1, at 148, col. 3. 
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example that occurred a few years ago, Detroit police allegedly wire-
tapped every public telephone in police headquarters114-almost 
certainly an intrusion upon lawyer-client conversations. 
New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan has indeed 
testified that he seeks very few orders and that there are no abuses 
in New York County.ms But even the sympathetic ABA Advisory 
Committee could not quite swallow the latter claim, for a report 
issued in the late 1950's by a New York state legislative committee 
which strongly favored wiretapping conceded that there had been 
serious abuses.116 Mr. Hogan's contention that he has sought very 
few orders and that the other prosecutors in New York City have 
shown similar self-restraint is both unproved and unprovable. Mr. 
Hogan claims to have averaged about seventy-five wiretap orders 
per year since June of 1958 and about nineteen bugging orders an-
nually.117 This may be a lot or a little-it depends on how many 
telephones, places, and people were involved. But this is only one 
small part of the picture. There are many other police and prose-
cutorial agencies in New York City and State who can eavesdrop. 
As to these, the Standards say only: "What has been true of the 
Office of the District Attorney of New York has also been largely 
true of the other agencies serving the cities"118-but no figures are 
presented. 
Unfortunately-at least for the residents of New York City-the 
ABA's implication of limited eavesdropping is simply not true. 
From 1952 to 1954, for example, the New York City police alone 
tapped some 2,625 telephones,119 many of which were public facili-
ties.120 This was at a time when they were averaging about 300 court 
orders for wiretapping per year.121 They were up to 451 court orders 
in 1963 and 671 in 1964,122 and though the figures for the number 
of telephones tapped in these years are not given, it cannot be small. 
114. Hofmann, Police Said To Tap Police in Detroit, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1967, at 
18, col. I. 
115. 1967 Senate Crime Hearings 1097. 
116. ADA STANDAI!.DS 84; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202 (1967). 
117. ABA STANDARDS 47, quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 116, at 95. 
118. Id. 
119. Note, Wiretapping-Analysis of the Law and Practice Under New York Con-
stitutional and Statutory Provisions, 31 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 197, 210 (1956). 
120. Id. at 210 n.96. 
121. See Hearings on the Current Wiretapping Dilemma in New York State 
Created by Federal Court Decisions Before the N.Y. Commn. of l7!vestigation 129 
(290 average from 1952-59); 1955 House Hearings (338 in 1952) (testimony of Edward 
Silver). 
122. See Statement of John F. Shanley, Supervising Assistant Chief Inspector, N.Y. 
Police Department, before Illinois Crime Comm., Feb. 5, 1965, at 2 (mimeo). 
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Finally, a state legislative committee recently reported that it knew 
of some 22,000 wiretaps in New York State over a period of twelve 
years.123 Since so many of these taps were made on public tele-
phones,124 the privacy of thousands of innocent people was invaded 
daily. This hardly seems like sparing use for "only ... important" 
investigations.125 
Reliable information on these surreptitious activities is not 
readily available. New York Judge Nathan Sobel has gone so far 
as to say: "No one, not the county prosecutor, nor the police, can 
furnish valid statistics as to the number of court orders issued. None 
are kept in the records of the court, prosecutor's office, or by the 
police."126 However, the recent and earlier revelations, which in-
evitably understate the picture, show indisputably that even without 
the legitimation provided by title III, law enforcement officials were 
eavesdropping intensively while flatly denying it in public.127 Is it 
likely that making these practices respectable will reduce the amount 
of eavesdropping? Is it not far more probable that if the legislation 
imposes any restraints, they will be as much ignored as the limita-
tions imposed by prior law? Such lawlessness is indeed inevitable 
since, as noted above, title III purports to legitimate only "tactical" 
eavesdropping undertaken for the purpose of obtaining evidence of 
a particular crime, not the kind of "strategic" surveillance that is 
allegedly needed for investigating organized crime. The only effect 
of title III may well be that from now on many who rarely or never 
eavesdropped will be able to possess the equipment openly and have 
it temptingly available for frequent use. 
B. The Impact of Title III on the Amount of Eavesdropping 
The openhandedness of title III is such that eavesdropping with-
out its blessings will rarely be necessary. The combination of a 
shopping list of eavesdroppable offenses, a less-than-airtight court 
order system, generous "emergency" powers, broad "national secu-
rity" provisions, and a somewhat ambiguous provision permitting 
electronic surveillance for offenses "about to be" committed ensures 
that an alert investigator will always be able to tune in legally, at 
least for a limited period of time. 
123. REPORT OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS BY N.Y. STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE 
COM!\UTTEE ON CRIME, !'rs CAUSES, CONTROL AND EFFECT ON SOCIETY 15 (1967). 
124. See PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 130 (public phones "a common target'); Note, 
supra note 119, at 210 n.96. 
125. ABA STANDARDS 46. 
126. Letter to Senator Edward V. Long, April 19, 1967, reprinted in 1967 Long 
Committee Hearings 642. 
127. See note 109 supra. 
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I. The Ofjenses for Which Eavesdropping Is Specifically 
Permitted 
481 
As noted above, the current attempt to justify eavesdropping is 
based almost exclusively on its indispensability as a tool for fighting 
organized crime. The legislation, however, is not so restricted. When 
an attempt was made in Congress to impose such a limit, Senators 
McClellan and Tydings, floor managers for the Crime Control Act, 
protested on the ground that they could not say what organized 
crime was.128 Senator McClellan also stressed that he wanted to 
allow eavesdropping on black militants like Rap Brown and Stokely 
Carmichael, 129 and the statute therefore allows eavesdropping on 
those suspected of being involved in civil disorders.130 
Perhaps because organized crime can engage in a wide variety 
of activities, title III allows eavesdropping for a vast number of 
offenses, many of which will not be associated with organized crime 
in most actual instances. For example, section 2516 allows federal 
officials to tap and bug not only for such common activities of 
organized crime as extortion, corruption, interstate gambling, loan 
sharking, labor racketeering, and the like, but also for any offense 
involving marijuana, riots, obstruction of a criminal investigation, 
counterfeiting, and theft from interstate shipments.131 
State officers are treated even more generously, despite the fact 
that the states have a far smaller role than the federal government 
in fighting organized crime. Indeed, one of the greatest problems in 
fighting organized crime is that, for reasons to be explored more 
fully below, few state or local law enforcement agencies show any 
128. E.g., Tydings: "I suspect it is very difficult to say what organized crime is.'' 
II4 CONG. REc. S6198 (daily ed. May 23, 1968); McClellan, id. at S6197-98. 
129. Id. at S6197, S6199. 
130. Act, § 2516(l)(a). 
131. There is one rather curious omission. Despite the importance of monopoly and 
other restraints of trade in the activities of organized crime [see Schelling, Economic 
Analysis and Organized Crime, in TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME II4 (1967)], 
the antitrust laws are not included in the federal list. Is that because the sponsors of 
the legislation are really not that concerned about such "respectable" crimes, despite 
the enormously greater cost to the community from such activities as price-fixing and 
boycotts? It should be noted that, as the author concluded from two years on the staff 
of the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, the enthusiasm of Senators Mc-
Clellan, Eastland, Dirksen, and Ervin for vigorous law enforcement has not usually 
extended to the antitrust laws. 
On the other hand, inclusion in this list of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1964), which pro-
hibits any travel in or use of interstate commerce to further activities related to 
gambling, narcotics, prostitution, extortion, bribery, or arson, in violation of any 
federal or state law, permits electronic eavesdropping by federal officers for a wide variety 
of often minor state offenses which happen to involve activities which cross a state line. I 
am indebted to Micliael Tigar for bringing this to my attention. 
482 Michigan Law Review [.Vol. 67:455 
interest in the enterprise.132 Yet, states are given authority to use 
electronic surveillance for offenses that are even further beyond the 
normal reaches of organized crime than those enumerated above. 
In fact, the list of offenses for which state eavesdropping is permitted 
is practically unlimited: "murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, 
bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other 
dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, 
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year .. . or any 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses."133 Since the 
legislative history indicates that a crime "dangerous to ... property" 
can include attempts to evade the payment of taxes,134 it is clear that 
any kind of pecuniary harm is covered by the statute, and that state 
officials can eavesdrop when investigating such offenses as state in-
come tax evasion, prize fighting in Connecticut, the theft of a horse 
or a chicken in other states,135 or smoking marijuana. Yet even with 
respect to certain serious offenses, the case for eavesdropping author-
ity is feeble, for the technique is of little use in solving murder cases 
and of almost no use in investigating robbery, rape, or any other 
crimes of violence that usually involved sudden, nonrepetitive en-
counters.136 Thus, far from limiting electronic eavesdropping to the 
"important investigation" or "a limited class of designated viola-
tions,"137 title III grants authority to use eavesdropping almost as 
freely as any other standard investigative tool. In this respect, it is 
not very different from the New York statute which allows eaves-
dropping for any crime,138 and under which some eighty per cent 
of police wiretapping was for the investigation of minor gambling 
and vice offenses.139 
132. See text accompanying notes 271-74. 
133. Act § 2516(2) (emphasis added). 
134. S. REP. No. 1097 at 99. 
135. S. REP. No. 1097 at 99. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-200 (1958), as amended 
(Supp., 1965); 11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 332 (1953); KY. REV. STAT. § 433.250 (1962); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-8-6 (1956). 
136. See Letter, supra note 126, in 1967 Long Committee Hearings 643. 
137. ABA STANDARDS 46, § 5.6 (comment a). 
138. [1968] Sess. Laws of N.Y. ch. 546, § 816, which replaced a similar earlier act, 
[1958] Sess. Laws of N.Y. ch. 676, § 813-a. 
139. For a discussion of New York police wiretapping, see PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 
128. 
A survey of the cases in the New York law reports prepared for the author by 
Gerald Kahn, Michigan Law School '69, confirms that eavesdropping is used widely for 
minor offenses and that organized-crime investigations account for a very small part 
indeed. Although hardly a scientific sample, the results of the survey are consistent with 
the findings of others. 
Title III is likely to encourage the extension of eavesdropping to states which have 
not used this technique before and have no real organized-crime problem. Police 
spokesmen from Pennsylvania, Florida, and Connecticut have made it clear that they 
would seek such authority from their states once federal enabling legislation is en• 
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2. Judicial Supervision 
The task of protecting privacy against whatever eavesdropping 
remains illegal rests primarily with the judiciary. Unfortunately, 
the experience with the few court order systems in effect prior to 
the enactment of the Crime Control Act has been "very bad"140 
according to Samuel Dash, who has made perhaps the most thorough 
study of this aspect of the problem; neither title III nor the ABA 
Standards will do much to improve things. In the past, supporting 
affidavits have often been skimpy141 and even false.142 Although the 
Standards claim that these problems have been solved by cases like 
Mapp v. Ohio143 and People v. McCall,144 some of the inadequate 
affidavits are post-Mapp and it is still too early to determine what 
effect McCall will have.145 
Moreover, even with more restrictive judicial supervision, some 
judges are not too demanding. For example, Congressman Emanuel 
Celler reported that he knew of one judge who used to sign hundreds 
of orders "without putting in any name and the [police] sergeant 
filled the names in. He could go down to the clerk and get any 
authorization he wanted."146 Some judges have publicly stated that 
they never refuse certain kinds of warrants.147 It is therefore hardly 
acted. Given today's climate and the respectability granted the practice by federal 
authorization, such legislation is likely to be passed, and perhaps not inappropriately. 
These are states which may well have some organized crime, although their inability 
to cope adequately with it until now is not really attributable to the lack of wire-
tapping authority. See text accompanying notes 263-74 infra. But we may also see 
enactment of such a statute in a state like Iowa. In 1962, an Iowa district attorney 
testified that despite the absence of any organized crime problem in his state, wire-
tapping "would be a valuable tool in Iowa to help us in solving the crimes that we 
have." Hearings on S. 2813 and S. 1195 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1962). 
140. 1961 Senate Hearings 104-05 (testimony of Samuel Dash). 
141. In re Interception of Telephone Communication, 207 Misc. 69, 136 N.Y.S.2d 
612, 613 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
142. Report of the King's County Grand Jury summarized in Westin, The Wire-
Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 165, 
195-96 (1952); see also 1955 House Hearings 217-18 (testimony of William Keating). 
The lengthy affidavit reprinted in ABA STANDARDS 191-94 as a "representative" affidavit 
seems anything but that, to judge from the affidavits in such cases as Berger, Katz, 
and others; see, e.g., People v. Gold, 46 Misc. 2d 860, 259 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1965); People 
v. Rogers, 46 Misc. 2d 860, 261 N.Y .S.2d 152 (1965). 
143. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
144. 17 N.Y.2d 152, 216 N.E.2d 570, 269 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1966). 
145. McCall held that eavesdropping orders were subject to a full hearing on 
legality, similar to other search warrants. 
146. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1967). 
147. New York Hearings, supra note 121, at 159 (testimony of former N.Y. S. Ct. 
Justice Ferdinand Pecora). The author heard one New York judge declare in an 
unguarded moment at a small but public bar association meeting in 1964 that, "I 
sign every wiretap order that's put in front of me." 
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surprising that few prosecutors have complained about the difficulty 
in obtaining orders.148 Despite the obvious dangers that officials will 
go "judge-shopping," neither title III nor the Standards attempt to 
incorporate any of the safeguards against such a practice that have 
been proposed elsewhere;140 both provisions allow application to 
any judge of competent jurisdiction.150 
The normal dangers of any ex parte application are somewhat 
reduced by an after-the-fact hearing if anything is seized or attempted 
to be used. For this procedure to be an effective safeguard, obvi-
ously there must be notice of the seizure; generally this is auto-
matically provided with the conventional search, but not with a 
surreptitious eavesdrop. Of course, there must also be a right and an 
opportunity to object. As to notice, title III offers relatively little. 
Sections 2518(8) and (9) provide that notice must be given only to 
the persons named in the application; it requires an affirmative 
exercise of discretion by the judge to give notice to others, and this 
in a setting where, by hypothesis, those others are not present to 
argue their case for notice. Thus, even parties to an intercepted con-
versation depend upon the discretion of the court if they are not 
named in the application, and on only partially informed discretion 
at that. Additionally, on an ex parte application, giving notice may 
be postponed, apparently indefinitely.151 If the content of that inter-
ception, or evidence derived from it, is offered in evidence, all 
parties to the proceeding must be given notice, but only an "ag-
grieved person"-defined as "a party to the intercepted communica-
tion . . . or party against whom the interception was directed" -
148. "It is practically unheard of for a judge to fail to grant a wiretap order for 
the district attorney." s. DASH, R. KNOWLTON, & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS 45 
(1959). See also Hearings on H.R. 408 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7, at 37 (1953) (testimony of former U.S. Attorney 
General, now Secretary of State William P. Rogers: "I don't recall any difficulty in getting 
permission of the court •••• it's pretty easy."); N. SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW 
OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 111 (1964). 
Lest such successes be considered a thing of the past, see Neyer, Book Review, 15 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NEW YoRK 8 (1967), indicating that when challenged, New York City 
Police Department and Brooklyn and Westchester D.A.'s representatives were unable to 
present a single instance in which they had been turned down. 
149. New York State Constitutional Convention, Text, Abstract and Highlights of 
Proposed Constitution of the State of New York, art. I, § 4 (1967). (When submitted 
to the electorate, the proposed constitution was defeated by a margin of nearly 3 to 1 
-Schanberg, Rockefeller Will Try To Salvage Sections of Beaten Proposal, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 8, 1967, at 1, col. 8). See also Assn., of the Bar of the City of New York Com-
mittees on Federal Legislation and Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, Proposed Legislation on Eavesdropping After Berger v. New York 
and Katz v. United States, 7 N.Y.C.B.A. Co11m. RPTs. BULL. 2, at 1 (1968). For proof 
of the practice, see Letter, supra note 126, in 1967 Long Commitee Hearings 643. 
150. Act § 2518(1); ABA STANDARDS § 5.1. 
151. Act § 2518(8)(d). 
January 1969] Electronic Eavesdropping 485 
may object.1152 The Act and Standards thus seem to mcorporate the 
existing restrictions on standing153 which are currently being recon-
sidered by the Supreme Court.1154 Under these limitations, strongly 
supported by the ABA,155 nonparties to an illegally intercepted 
conversation will rarely be able to object, no matter how much they 
are affected by the interception. Therefore, in the not uncommon 
situation where the interception is used to persuade the party 
overheard to inform on a third person, the third party would not 
be entitled to challenge.156 This inhibition on third-party challenges 
is particularly troublesome in the eavesdropping area, since the use 
of seized communications is often quite indirect.157 
Moreover, title III makes no attempt to ensure disclosure of the 
existence of eavesdropping. Forcing such disclosure can be extremely 
difficult, as the recent Long Committee hearings have made clear. 
Some added protection might result from requiring the prosecutor, 
on demand, to make a full investigation of all officers who have 
worked on a case, and on that basis to state, under oath, whether 
eavesdropping has been used at any time. Othenvise, the defense may 
find it impossible to meet the Nardone158 burden of introducing 
some evidence of eavesdropping in order to put the matter in issue. 
Even this device is likely to be relatively feeble, for, in the last anal-
ysis, "barring accidental discovery, all disclosure of such surveillance 
152. Act§§ 2518(10), 2510(11); S. REP. No. 1097, at 91, 106. 
153. For the existing law, see Berger; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); 
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). The standing requirement has been 
abolished in California. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755,290 P.2d 855 (1955). 
154. Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 136, petition for 
rehearing granted and order denying petition for writ of certiorari set aside, 392 U.S. 
919 (1968). The Solicitor General opposes liberalization of the standing requirements on 
the ground that this would entitle every criminal defendant to "examine the records of 
every conversation ever overheard by the government, on the theory that the overhearing 
of any conversation might have produced investigative leads which eventually led to 
evidence that was used against him." Brief for the United States at 24. This burden can 
apparently be met sometimes. See United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1968). 
155. The Standards justify the current standing rule with the comment that it "pro-
vides a convenient ••. line between 'enough' and 'too much' deterrence." ABA STANDARDS 
117. Can there be "too much" deterrence of illegal conduct? If the community may 
prosecute such illegality in the name of deterrence, a remedy provided by title III but 
usually futile, why may not the injured party more effectively seek to deter it by pre-
venting his prosecution? Or is the demand for "law and order" inapplicable to the 
forces of "justice"? 
156. See, e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). 
157. Eavesdropping evidence is actually used primarily for leads and intelligence, 
and is introduced in court rather infrequently because of the difficulties in transcrip-
tion; see 1955 House Hearings 331 (testimony of Frank Hogan). There is, of course, a 
great danger that what will be introduced will often be the eavesdroppers' recreated 
version of what was overheard. This seems to have happened in the Berger case 
itself. Grutzner, Berger Attacks Recorded Talks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1964, at 46, col. I. 
158. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
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ultimately depends upon the good faith of those who have the power 
and mechanical ability to utilize this technique."169 As we now know, 
skillful prosecutors have been able to avoid disclosing the existence 
of wiretapping, and even to avoid learning about it themselves. And 
even where the defendant can overcome these obstacles and make an 
attack, the recent dilution of the standards for probable cause in 
Peters v. New York160 means that there is little chance of a suc-
cessful challenge unless the lower courts agree that more stringent 
standards are necessary in eavesdropping cases-a probably futile 
hope. 
Finally, the requirement set forth in section 2518(l)(c), that rea-
sons must be given as to why measures other than eavesdropping are 
not used, is likely to be of little or no significance if any relationship 
to organized crime is alleged; and this seems to be the only require-
ment specially imposed for wiretapping and bugging. 
In sum, title Ill's court order provision offers relatively little 
protection on its face, and merely adopts the conventional court 
order system with all its shortcomings. For this reason, it may seem 
that at least some of the foregoing criticisms apply not so much to 
title III in particular but rather to judicial supervision in any con-
text. To some degree this is true, for there is much discontent with 
judicial supervision of invasions of privacy.161 Given such weak-
nesses in the over-all system, however, it becomes all the more im-
portant to introduce as many meaningful safeguards as possible, and, 
if none of these is really effective, to ask whether eavesdropping 
authority should be given at all. 
C. Emergency Authority 
Even the feeble safeguards of title III seem to be too severe for 
its authors and the ABA Advisory Committee, for under both the 
Act and the Standards, police can either forestall judicial super-
vision until something good turns up or avoid it entirely. One of 
the means of avoidance is provided by the "emergency" provision 
159. United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1968). For a discussion of how 
prosecutors have been able to avoid disclosure of electronic eavesdropping by simple 
denial that their evidence was derived through such techniques, see Note, Exclusion of 
Evidence Obtained by Wire Tapping: An Illusory Safeguard, 61 YALE L.J. 1221 (1952). 
Such tactics are no longer quite so effective since the Supreme Court has decided that 
decisions on exclusion may not be made solely on the basis of the prosecutor's repre-
sentation. Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136 (1968). 
160. 389 U.S. 950 (1968). But see Spinelli v. United States, 4 CR. L. REP. 3083 Gan. 
27, 1969). 
161. See Report on Criminal Courts Committee, Bronx County Bar Association, 
reported in N.Y. Times, March 10, 1965, at 51 (warrants frequently granted on false 
affidavits); H. Schwartz, Stop and Frisk, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8e P.S. 433, 450-51 (1967). 
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of the Act, section 2518(7), which allows police to eavesdrop for up 
to forty-eight hours without prior judicial approval if "an emergency 
situation exists with respect to conspiratorial activities threatening 
the national security interest or to conspiratorial activities charac-
teristic of organized crime," and if there are grounds upon which 
an order could be based. It is obviously possible to use a plea of emer-
gency as justification for some fishing on the basis of hunches;162 
this has often occurred in the past,163 and the police apparently want 
to continue doing so regularly. If nothing turns up, nothing is lost, 
for who will ever find out? If something does turn up within forty-
eight hours, the police can then apply to a judge for retroactive rati-
fication. And, as the Supreme Court has recognized, at such a 
point the pressure on the judge to ratify a successful investigation 
in order to permit use of relevant evidence is very strong indeed,164 
especially if the particular magistrate, like so many judges, is not 
altogether happy with the exclusionary rule when it prohibits the 
use of important evidence. Experience also indicates that an officer 
seeking to validate his original intrusion will rarely hesitate to em-
broider the past a bit in order to make it easier for the judge to find 
the probable cause ab initio.165 
Both the wisdom and the constitutionality of this emergency 
power are dubious.166 No criteria for determining what will be con-
sidered an "emergency" are indicated in the statute.167 Indeed, only 
one example is given in the legislative history: a meeting of suspected 
criminals is arranged and then held almost immediately thereafter, 
leaving no time for the police to obtain an order.168 
What justification is there for always allowing such a lengthy 
postponement169 of resort to a magistrate in such a situation? Surely 
162. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 216 (1966): PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 128. 
163. In one case, police bugged a series of conversations for a week, picking up 
apparently quite intimate conversations, and then dropped the matter when they 
found nothing criminal. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 124-25. 
164. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) ("the far less reliable procedure of an 
after-the-event justification for the ••• search, [is] too likely to be subtly influenced 
by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment''). 
165. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 162, at 144; L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, 8: D. ROTEN· 
DERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 128 (1967). 
166. Significantly, this was the provision which came closest to defeat, prevailing 
in the Senate by only a seven-vote margin: 44-37. 114 CONG. REc. S6193 (daily ed. May 
23, 1968). 
167. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("hot pursuit" exception). 
168. S. REP. No. 1097, at 104; ABA STANDARDS 13. 
169. It may be more than forty-eight hours: the officers need apply to a magistrate 
"within 48 hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur,'' with no pro-
vision for "whichever is earlier," as appears in the very next sentence. Act § 2518(7). 
Where the interception, that is, the "aural acquisition of ••• any wire or oral com-
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sometime during the forty-eight hours the eavesdropping officers 
can-and probably must-notify someone at their headquarters of 
their activities and the reason for the eavesdrop, and certainly that 
person could arrange for the application. In another context we are 
told by District Attorney Hogan and the ABA Advisory Committee 
that it requires four to six men to set up an interception, and much 
time and effort.170 If so, at least one of this large group should be 
able to arrange for someone to get to a magistrate in less than forty-
eight hours, especially since few meetings are likely to last for nvo 
full days without interruption. Nor does it normally take forty-
eight hours to find a judge. Even Senator Tydings claimed that it 
takes only "twelve to fourteen hours sometimes,"171 and, in large 
cities where most organized crime conspiracies are encountered, 
one can usually find a magistrate quite quickly.172 With the possible 
exception of time periods beginning on Friday nights, it will almost 
never require two days to find a sitting-much less a sleeping-
magistrate. 
It is also hard to believe that emergencies of the kind described 
are so frequent and important that, despite the obvious potential 
for abuse, a special broad exemption must be created for them. 
Judge and former district attorney Edward S. Silver has commented 
on this point: "The need for an order doesn't suddenly pop up. A 
situation develops over a long period of time, at least a considerable 
number of days. Thus the law-enforcing agent has plenty of time 
to get the order if he has the legal grounds upon which to get it."173 
The constitutional authority for such emergency powers is as 
dubious as the wisdom of granting them. In Katz, the Court expressly 
rejected the Government's request for a similar exemption from ob-
servance of the warrant requirement, saying that "the use of elec-
tronic surveillance without prior. authorization [ could not] be justi-
fied on the ground of 'hot pursuit.' "174 The Court then cited Warden 
v. Hayden115 with the comment that "[a]lthough 'the Fourth Amend-
ment does not require police to delay ... if to do so would gravely 
munication," takes several hours or days, the 48 hours may run from its termination. 
Act § 2510(4). 
170. 1961 Hearings 1094; ABA STANDARDS 45. 
171. 114 CoNG. REc. S6192 (daily ed. May 23, 1968). 
172. Even so experienced an eavesdropper as former Brooklyn District Attorney 
Edward S. Silver conceded this point at one time. 1955 House Hearings 98 ("He can 
get an order pretty quickly if he has the grounds to get it.'). 
173. Id. 
174. 389 U.S. at 357-58. 
175. 389 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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endanger their lives or the lives of others,' Warden v. Hayden ... 
there seems little likelihood that electronic surveillance would be 
a realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency."176 The 
obvious implication from Katz, and of course from Warden itself, 
is that the only emergency justifying a dispensation from antecedent 
judicial approval is one posing a danger to life-not merely a loss 
of evidence. 
On the other hand, Carroll v. United States177 and Schmerber v. 
California178 do support some relaxation of the warrant requirements 
for a wider range of emergencies, for in both cases a warrant was 
dispensed with in connection with a search for nonlethal evidence 
and in neither was there any danger to life. Although for some reason 
the Government did not invoke these cases for this point in Katz, 179 
the Senate Committee Report and Standards rely heavily on them, 
with the Report completely ignoring Katz; in addition, the Standards 
cite present New York law as a precedent.180 
Although the Carroll and Schmerber cases do offer some support 
for emergency powers, they are readily distinguishable on several 
significant grounds. In the first place, in neither case was there really 
any time at all, much less forty-eight hours, in which to obtain a 
magistrate's approval. In Carroll, it was possible that only a matter 
of minutes would elapse between the moment when the officers 
spotted Carroll's car and the time when he might have eluded them 
permanently. Similarly, the police in Schmerber probably had at 
best only a few hours in which to obtain a valid blood sample before 
the alcohol content of the suspect's bloodstream diminished, and, 
since Schmerber was arrested in the very early hours of the morn-
ing, this could well have happened before a magistrate became 
available.181 Second, Carroll involved a situation in which contra-
band might have been permanently lost if it was not seized imme-
diately, and the state's independent interest in preventing continued 
circulation of such contraband was at stake-usually a more sig-
nificant interest than the mere collection of evidence. Schmerber, 
176. 389 U.S. at 358 n.21. 
177. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
178. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
179. See Brief for Respondent United States, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967). Carroll was cited for a related point on constitutionally protected areas. Id. 
at 17, 18. 
180. S. REP. No. 1097, at 104; ABA STANDARDS 134, citing former N.Y. Code Crim. 
Proc. § 813(b). 
181. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. See also 384 U.S. at 770-71: "[W)here time had to be taken 
to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there 
was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant." 
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while involving mere evidence and not contraband, dealt with a 
situation where the most significant kind of evidence-and perhaps 
the only kind-would be irretrievably lost during the time it took 
to secure the approval of a magistrate. 
Finally, the reliance on New York precedent by the ABA com-
mentary is also somewhat dubious: although prior New York law 
did contain an emergency provision, the New York legislation 
enacted after the Katz decision omitted such a section.182 
D. National Security 
The second specific means by which law enforcement officials 
can avoid direct judicial supervision is by invoking title Ill's "na-
tional security" exemption. Relaxation of the limits on electronic 
eavesdropping on these grounds has long bedevilled civil libertarians. 
They have claimed, with some justification, that such an exception 
really has little value, that the power has been abused,183 and that 
the constitutional arguments apply here in the same way that they 
do in other eavesdropping situations. Nevertheless, there has never 
been much hope that such practices could be stopped, since they are 
performed in secret and rarely come to light thereafter. Few polit-
ical figures are willing to speak out against such an exemption, 
partly because there is an inevitable and apparently unshakable 
feeling that where "national security" is concerned, the practice must 
be of some value.184 The world of intelligence and counterintelli-
gence is regarded as "dirty business" anyway, and electronic eaves-
dropping seems an inevitable part of this way of life whether or not 
its value can be proved. 
For practical purposes, the controversy over the national security 
exemption has centered on whether this type of eavesdropping 
should be subjected to judicial control. The Supreme Court has not 
yet had to meet this issue,185 although a facet of the problem is cur-
182. Compare [1968] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 546 with former N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
§ 813-b; State of New York Temporary Commn. on Revision of the Penal Law and 
Criminal Code, Proposed Crim. Proc. L. § 370.20 (1967). Recent New Jersey legislation, 
patterned after title III, requires at least verbal judicial approval. 4 CR. L. REP. 2346 
aan. 14, 1969). 
183. For a listing of some of the abuses which includes the destruction of tapes 
by the FBI and the bugging of John L. Lewis, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, and various 
government officials, see, e.g., Theoharis &: Meyer, The "National Security" Justification 
for Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 749, 760-62 
(1968). 
184. This may be at least part of the reason for former Attorney General Ramsey 
Clark's support for electronic surveillance in national security cases, despite his skep· 
ticism as to its value generally. For criticism of this alleged inconsistency, see Ruth, 
Why Organized Crime Thrives, 374 ANNALS 113, 116 n.4 (1967). 
185. See Katt v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 Gustice Stewart for the ma• 
jority), 363-64 Gustice White, concurring), 359-60 Gustice Douglas, concurring). 
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rently before the Court,186 and until the passage of the Crime Control 
Act it seemed as if the general eavesdropping impasse would leave 
this question unresolved also.187 Section 2511(3) of the Act now legit-
imates the President's power to order eavesdropping for purposes of 
intelligence and counterintelligence against foreign powers without 
antecedent judicial approval. The provision, however, goes beyond 
this customary formulation of the national security exemption: it 
extends the exception to "any other clear and present danger to the 
structure and existence of the government," language so broad that 
it might be construed to embrace even a movement to alter the 
electoral college, or more pertinently, any black militant or radical 
group such as the Black Panther Party, the Students for a Demo-
cratic Society (SDS), the "Yippies," or any other "subversive" organ-
ization even though it has no credible links to a foreign power. It 
has recently been revealed that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
who first authorized such eavesdropping, intended the power to be 
exercised very sparingly and only on aliens,188 but the power was 
expanded during both World War II and the early days of the Cold 
War.189 There is no reason to think that the amount of electronic 
surveillance for this purpose has since diminished in any respect.190 
The Crime Control Act thus merely continues this tendency to 
sweep dissent and difference under the heading of "national secur-
ity." 
When objections to the broad sweep of the national security ex-
emption were raised in Congress, Senator McClellan declared that 
the provision would not give the President any more powers than 
those he already has under the Constitution.191 This is not altogether 
clear, however. When the national security section is read in light 
of its legislative history, it expresses a clear intent to allow eaves-
dropping on such activities without any judicial supervision, a great 
and almost unique departure from normal fourth amendment re-
quirements. The Senate Committee Report stresses that even where 
such intrusions eventually come before a judge because an attempt 
186. Ivanov v. United States, 384 F.2d 554 (1967), cert. granted, 392 U.S. 923 (1968). 
The primary issue in the case relates to the degree to which eavesdropping logs and 
notes must be disclosed to the defense for purposes of determining taint, where the 
existence of such eavesdropping comes to light. The Government is seeking to restrict 
this to what a judge, after an in camera examination, deems relevant; cf. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500 Gencks statute related to impeachment). 
187. Some observers believed that this issue was the primary cause of the impasse. 
188. Theoharis & Meyer, supra note 183, at 768 n.100. 
189. Id. at 760-61. 
190. Indeed, Professor Westin has concluded that there is now probably more 
eavesdropping than ever before. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM: 119. 
191. 114 CoNc. REc. S6245 (daily ed. May 23, 1968). 
492 Michigan Law Review £Vol. 67:455 
is made to use the fruits in evidence-and this will be a relatively 
rare occurrence192-admissibility will turn on reasonableness only, 
with the possibility of prior judicial authorization but one factor 
to be considered in the determination. The Senate Report states: 
"No preference should be given to either alternative [that is, whether 
a warrant was or was not obtained], since this would tend to limit 
the very power that this provision recognizes is not to be deemed 
disturbed."193 
The constitutionality of this latter construction is dubious. So 
far, no general exception to the warrant requirement has been recog-
nized for national security cases,194 let alone an exception for so vague 
and overbroad a class of activities as those which might pose a 
"danger to the structure ... of the government." Recently, in United 
States v. Robel,195 the Court stressed that the talismanic phrase "na-
tional defense" cannot be used to override those rights and values 
which the national defense is supposed to safeguard. In earlier con-
gressional discussion, the Justice Department sought to avoid judi-
cial supervision, allegedly because of fear of information leaks and 
prejudicial delay.196 Leaks and delay were said to be unlikely, how-
ever, by Judge Edward Silver, 197 who criticized such an exception to 
antecedent judicial supervision despite his general desire to have 
eavesdropping authority. Even if the case for such an exception were 
stronger than it is, there is really no reason why these powers could 
not be scrutinized by an appropriate committee of Congress. The 
ABA Standards refer to the desirability of such supervision, but 
they omit any detailed analysis.198 
Because antecedent approval and virtually all post hoc supervi-
sion are abrogated for this potentially vast range of activity, it is 
doubtful that the "probable cause" requirements can effectively limit 
192. In Ivanov, the Solicitor General declared "[T]he government has not claimed 
that evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping in the course of a national security 
investigation is admissible in a criminal trial." Brief for the United States at 8-9. 
193. S. REP. No. 1097, at 94. 
194. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23. In Ivanov, the Solicitor Gen-
eral has asserted that "[i]t is at least arguable that, within this narrow area, the 
Executive has independent constitutional authority .•• [because] the 'President • • • 
possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as 
Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs.' " (Brief for the 
United States at 6), citing C. & S. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 
(1948), which refused to review "Presidential discretion as to political matters" (333 
U.S. at 114) involving grant of an international route to one airline. 
195. 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967). 
196. Hearings on S. 2813 and S. 1495 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1962) (testimony of Robert Kennedy). 
197. See, e.g., 1955 House Hearings 98. 
198. ABA STANDARDS § 3.1-.2, comment a; cf. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 391. 
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eavesdropping that is allegedly related to the protection of national 
security. There is no way to compel disclosure of the existence of 
such eavesdropping in the first place, so that compliance with what-
ever "reasonableness" requirements are imposed can be verified.199 
In the very few instances where such a disclosure does occur, the 
Senate Report declares that the statute requires only an "ad hoc" 
determination of reasonableness, "taking into consideration all of 
the facts and circumstances of the individual case, which is but the 
test of the Constitution itself."20° Carroll v. United States, which the 
Senate Report cites in support of this proposition, did insist on 
probable cause;201 but where national security is balanced against 
the intrusion, the standards almost certainly will be relaxed, as 
they have been elsewhere.202 The ABA Standards increase this possi-
bility by invoking the much-criticized and heretofore unique "border 
search" as a precedent.203 
The national security provision is therefore likely to exempt 
such eavesdropping from present constitutional limitations almost 
completely. This seems to be the only fourth amendment area where 
an outright exemption is made because of the type of offense under 
investigation-except for the border search204-and it is yet another 
instance in which Congress has required fewer protections limiting 
eavesdropping, not more as Berger directed. Further, the breadth of 
the exemption will permit much intrusion on private speech and 
association, thereby raising serious first amendment issues.205 Since 
this power probably will be used almost exclusively for intelligence 
and rarely for evidentiary purposes, challenge and control of even 
the mildest variety will be virtually impossible.206 
199. Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark voluntarily disclosed the existence of 
electronic eavesdropping in such cases as Ivanov, Clay, and many others, but these are 
cases in litigation, and the demands of fairness mandate such disclosure. Moreover, even 
in such instances, experience in Coplon and other cases indicates that disclosure will 
rarely be made voluntarily. See Report on Certain Alleged Practices of the F.BJ., IO 
LAW. Gun.D R.Ev. 185 (1950), for examples of very wide-ranging eavesdropping in na-
tional security cases which would ordinarily not be disclosed. 
200. S. REP. No. 1097, at 94. 
201. 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925). 
202. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), for a discussion of balanc-
ing where national security is concerned. 
203. ABA STANDARDS § 3.2, comment b. For the criticism, see Note, Search and 
Seizure at the Border-The Border Search, 21 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 513 (1967); Comment, 
Intrusive Border Searches-Is Judicial Control Desirable?, II5 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 276 
(1966); Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007 
(1967). The Standards omit any reference to this criticism. 
204. Cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), in which the FBI had to resort 
to an Immigration Naturalization Service arrest because it lacked probable cause. 
205. This of course distinguishes it from the usual border search which raises no 
such issues. 
206. In this connection, the Standards almost indignantly reject any attempt to 
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E. Some Problems of Scope 
Title III and the Standards at least purport to subject emergency 
eavesdropping to ostensibly significant controls, and to place national 
security eavesdropping under some restrictions. With respect to two 
kinds of eavesdropping, however, the legislation and the ABA pro-
posal do not even atempt to impose limits; those interceptions that 
take place with the consent of one of the parties and those which 
occur by means of an extension telephone. Some brief comments are 
in order for each of these problems. 
I. Extension Telephones 
Under the definition of "device" given in section 2510(5), an ex-
tension telephone is excluded from the Act's prohibitions. There 
is no authority for such an exception, nor is any explanation given 
for it in the legislative history of title III. The only possible support 
for this exclusion is Rathbun v. United States,201 but that case turned 
on a statutory definition of "intercept,"208 and, more fundamentally, 
it involved consent by one of the parties to the conversation. 
deny the government the right to use such evidence in court on the ground that this 
would produce secret eavesdropping and a Kafkaesque world. ABA STANDARDS 122•24. 
But this comment almost seems tongue in cheek, for it is clear that the power to keep 
the eavesdropping secret still remains with the government, and the Standards make no 
effort to change this. Moreover, denial of admissibility in an attempt (probably futile) to 
discourage excessive eavesdropping by making it less profitable does not imply non-
disclosure-a defendant could still be allowed to find out whether any of the fruits 
of eavesdropping were used as leads, even if not as evidence. Joseph K's problem was 
not that his accusers couldn't use any of their evidence against him but that he 
couldn't find out what the charges and evidence were. 
An additional opportunity for extensive wiretapping appears in the probable 
cause section: an order can be issued to obtain facts concerning a crime "about to be 
committed." § 2518(l)(b), (3). No Supreme Court case has approved or even dealt with 
such an anticipatory search. Berger is cited by the Senate Committee Report, but 
Berger, citing the classic statements in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 
(1949) and Carroll, refers solely to searches for crimes which have been or are being 
committed. 388 U.S. at 55, 56, 58. The only Supreme Court reference to such a con-
cept appears in Justice Douglas' dissent in Terry v. Ohio, where he describes the 
occasions for a search. 392 U.S. I, 35 (1968). 
A search for evidence of a crime "about to committed" throws the possibility of 
surveillance even farther back in time than the present broad scope of such inchoate 
crimes as attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation allow. It is too early to tell whether 
this is wise, but it is certainly both novel and troublesome. The Justice Department 
disapproved this provision on the ground that it was vague and likely to be abused. 
114 CoNG. REc. S6108-11 (daily ed. May 22, 1968). Its vagueness was demonstrated 
during the Senate debate. When Senators Tydings and McClellan were challenged to 
cite cases of a crime "about to be committed" which did not really amount to a 
crime already or then being committed, they were unable to do so. 114 CoNG. REc. 
S6110 (daily ed. May 22, 1968). Senator McClellan fell back on Katz, where the police 
had evidence that the defendant was engaged in illegal activity before they installed 
the tap; Senator Tydings provided a case which involved an existing as well as a future 
violation. 
207. 355 U.S. 107 (1957). 
208. See United States v. Jones 292 F. Supp. 1001 (D.D.C. 1968). 
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There are many situations in which undesirable eavesdropping 
may be accomplished by using an extension telephone. Indeed, the 
exemption is broader than the traditional home telephone that comes 
to mind when we think of an extension. It includes all equipment 
"furnished to the subscriber or user by a communications common 
carrier in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the 
subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business."209 This 
definition can encompass a switchboard in a huge corporation, law 
firm, or hotel to which police gain access with or without the per-
mission of the subscriber.210 Surely invasions of privacy of this mag-
nitude are too serious to be excluded from control. Perhaps the 
law should not try to regulate eavesdropping by one family member 
upon another over an extension telephone, but the present exemp-
tion in this area is far too broad to accomplish such a limited 
objective. 
2. Consent 
Title III and the Standards also grant a blanket exclusion from 
control for eavesdropping that is undertaken with the consent of 
one party to the communication. This exception was easy to support 
with decisions like On Lee v. United States211 and Lopez v. United 
States212-at least until Osborn213 and Katz were decided. The Court 
originally granted certiorari in Osborn in order to consider the con-
tinuing vitality of Lopez;214 it chose, however, to affirm the convic-
tion not on the basis of Lopez and its consent theory, but rather on 
the ground of antecedent judicial approval. The Court's choice 
of this ground for decision, plus the aforementioned approving refer-
ences to that rationale in Berger and Katz, may indicate that Justice 
Brennan's dissent in Lopez,215 in which he concluded that surrepti-
209. Act § 2510(5)(a)(i). 
210. The Long Committee Hearings brought out the existence of equipment 
known as "service-observing equipment," leased by telephone companies to approxi-
mately 4,000 firms and individuals. With it, a president of a company can listen in 
on all the phone conversations taking place and can, of course, permit others to do 
so as well. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 395. Professor Westin has also pointed out 
the great cooperation between hotel managers and the police. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 
120-21. 
211. 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
212. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). In On Lee, a government informer was outfitted with a 
radio transmitter, and sent into the suspect's laundry; their conversation was over-
heard and testified to by government agents. In Lopez, a government revenue agent, 
whom the suspect tried to bribe, recorded his conversation with the suspect on a 
miniature recorder, the tapes from which were introduced as evidence to corrobate 
the agent's testimony. 
213. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 326 (1966). 
214. 385 U.S. at 324-25. 
215. 373 U.S. at 446. 
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tious recording of a conversation by one of the parties thereto was an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, will soon be accepted by a 
majority of the Court. In addition, Justice Stewart's comment 
that "what [ a person] . . . seeks to preserve as private . . . may be 
constitutionally protected"216 has led at least a few courts to conclude 
that On Lee and its progeny are now dead.217 Indeed, the Solicitor 
General recently informed the Court, during oral argument of the 
Ivanov case, that in his judgment governmental eavesdropping on a 
conversation between nvo people may violate the fourth amendment 
as interpreted in Katz even if one party consented to an inter-
ception.218 
The consent problem is too difficult to explore in detail here;219 
but surely one cannot easily dismiss the threats to privacy posed by 
consensual eavesdropping of the kind approved in On Lee. Indeed, 
Professor Westin has concluded that this is perhaps the most wide-
spread form of electronic surveillance being used today and that it 
should not be left unregulated.220 Under title III and the decisions 
in On Lee and Hoffa v. United States,221 however, there are virtually 
no judicial controls on the use of electronic aids in schemes utilizing 
informers to deceive suspects into making self-incriminatory state-
ments; the only hope seems to be that the Osborn procedure may 
eventually become mandatory.222 
216. 389 U.S. at 351-52. 
217. Compare White v. United States, 4 CR. L. REP 2317 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 1969); 
Doty v. United States, 3 CR. L. REP. 2220 (10th Cir. June 4, 1968); and United States v. 
Jones, 292 F. Supp. 1001 (D.D.C. 1968); with United States v. Kaufer, 4 CR. L. REP. 
2333 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 1969), Dancy v. United States, 390 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1968) and 
Handsford v. United States, 390 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1967) (On Lee still good law). The 
issue has been ably presented to the Court in a petition for certiorari filed in Douglas 
v. Massachusetts, petition for certiorari filed, 3 CR. L. REP. 2186 Gune 5, 1968). 
218. Oral Argument by Solicitor General Griswold in Ivanov v. United States, No. 
11 (U.S. 1968), at 27: 
Q. Mr. Solicitor General, assume that A invites B and C to a meeting at his 
house and A consents, asks the Government or consents to the taping of that 
conversation by the Government. Now, the Government position is that B and C 
-has there been any violation of the Fourth Amendment? 
A. Mr. Justice, I think there may be under the Katz case. 
Q. Even though A has consented? 
A. Even though A has consented, just as though the telephone company con-
sented in the Katz case, I don't think that would have made any difference. 
219. See Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping; 
Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 
CoLUM:. L. REv. 189 (1968). 
220. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM: 131 ("used tens of thousands of times each year"), 390 
("Allowing eavesdropping with the consent of one party would destroy the statutory 
plan of limiting the offenses for which eavesdropping by device can be used and 
insisting on a court order process."). 
221. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
222. If it does not, we shall continue to be exposed to the kind of totally un-
controlled intrusion which Professor Leslie Fiedler and his family endured at the 
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F. Other Sanctions: The Reporting System and Private Actions 
Title III contains one provision which might induce some re-
straint with regard to the number of eavesdropping orders issued. 
Section 2519 requires that state and federal judges must send full 
reports of all orders applied for and issued to the Administrator of 
the United States Courts. In addition, the principal prosecuting 
officers of each state and the federal government must report to the 
Administrator all arrests, trials, and convictions resulting from such 
, orders. The Administrator must then transmit a summary of this 
information to Congress in April of each year. I£ the figures are made 
public-and the statute is silent on that point-widespread court-
ordered eavesdropping might produce an adverse public reaction. 
This in tum could induce some reduction in the number of orders 
granted. Of course, the importance of this provision depends on the 
existence and amount of publicity given to the report. 
The Act also contains a provision permitting the victims of eaves-
dropping performed in violation of the statute to recover civil dam-
ages of 100 dollars per day or 1,000 dollars, whichever is higher, in 
addition to punitive damages, a reasonable attorney's fee, and court 
costs.223 This provision could also have the beneficial result of 
reducing illegal eavesdropping when such illicit surveillance does in 
£act come to light. Damage actions against illegal police activity in 
other contexts have not been overly effective in reducing police mis-
conduct; however, some of the people whose conversations are 
hands of the Buffalo, New York, police. Fiedler, an outspoken proponent of marijuana 
legalization and an equally outspoken critic of the Buffalo Narcotics Squad, was arrested 
in 1967 for maintaining premises where marijuana was located. The prosecution's case 
is based entirely on evidence obtained by sending a sixteen-year-old girl, a school 
friend of the Fiedler's fifteen-year-old daughter, into Fiedler's home some eighteen 
to twenty-seven times over a nine-week period. On each entry the girl, who was in a 
psychiatric hospital immediately before she was engaged by the police to spy on the 
Fiedlers, carried a radio transmitter which broadcast conversations in the home to 
police listening outside. There were times that the girl would insist on coming in 
with gifts even when Mrs. Fiedler told her not to visit that day. There is no evidence 
in the record that the police had probable cause to believe that Fiedler or anyone 
else in the house was involved in lawbreaking when they first sent the girl in. At 
the hearing the girl admitted lying under oath to Fiedler's counsel about whether she 
had planted any drugs in the Fiedler home. Record of Hearing To Suppress Evidence at 
67, People v. Kurt Fiedler, 4 CR. L. REP. 2187 (App. Div. N.Y. Nov. 31, 1968). 
The case against Leslie Fiedler has not yet been tried. In a companion case involving 
Fiedler's son, an appeal from a lower court's denial of a motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained by the girl was rejected by a 3-2 vote although on grounds other than those cited 
by the trial court. The latter relied on Justice White's reaffirmation of On Lee in 
his concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 362, 363 n.•, but the Appellate 
Division majority ruled instead that the search warrant which produced the evidence 
had not been based on eavesdropping evidence. People v. Kurt Fiedler, 4 CR. L. REP. 2187 
(App. Div. N.Y. Nov. 31, 1968). 
223. Act § 2520. 
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illegally overheard may be in a better financial position to bring 
suit effectively than the class of people who are normally victims of 
the more traditional modes of police misconduct. 
IV. THE NEED FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
Title Ill's grant of the power to issue these latter-day general 
warrants is rationalized by the claim that without electronic surveil-
lance the fight against organized crime would collapse,224 and that 
with this failure the foundations of the Republic would totter.2215 
But the public seems to want many of the illicit services provided by 
organized crime, and is still rather apathetic about combatting it226 
despite steady torrents of propaganda during the last ten years. The 
community is, however, seriously agitated about street crime and 
riots. Thus, these concerns were frequently invoked during the floor 
debate on title III, 227 even though electronic surveillance has nothing 
to do with alleviating either problem. But by the manipulation of 
such irrelevancies is major legislation enacted.228 
One cannot confidently make the unqualified assertion that elec-
tronic eavesdropping is not a useful device. Its very "dirtiness"-its 
secret intrusion into what people try to keep confidential-seems to 
ensure that it would be of some value to law enforcement agencies, 
just as the threat and application of coercion probably produce a 
significant number of confessions. But the issue in both cases is the 
indispensability of the technique to the solution of major crimes, 
and with both electronic eavesdropping and confessions, the myth 
of necessity may far surpass the reality.229 Most of the ABA Com-
224. S. REP. No. 1097, at 74; ABA STANDARDS 70-78. 
225. ABA STANDARDS 26-43; especially 40-43; S. REP. No. 1097, at 70-74. 
226. Gardiner, Public Attitude Toward Gambling and Corruption, 374 ANNAIS 
123 (1967); Ruth, Why Organized Crime Thrives, id. at 113, 120-22 (1967). 
227. See, e.g., 114 CoNG. REc. S6207 (Senator McClellan on the dangers of the situa-
tion in Washington at night), S6197 (and on the need to eavesdrop on black mili-
tants) (daily ed. May 23, 1968). 
228. In the House, proponents of the Crime Control Act overcame what was ex-
pected to be stiff opposition, primarily by invoking the assassination of Senator 
Robert F. Kennedy [see, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. H4587 (daily ed. June 6, 1968) (remarks 
of Melvin Laird); id. at H4595-96 ijune 6, 1968) (remarks of Roman C. Pucinski)] even 
though Kennedy was on record as opposing both title II and title III. For his views on 
title II, see 114 CONG. REc. S6019 (daily ed. May 21, 1968) (paired for amendment striking 
title II); on title III, see id. at S6210 (May 23, 1968) (Senator Byrd stating that Senator 
Kennedy was absent, but if present would vote for striking all of title III). 
229. With respect to confessions, see S. REP. No. 1097, at 151 (minority report) and 
numerous studies including Medalie, Zeitz, &: Alexander, Custodial Police Interroga-
tion in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt To Implement Miranda, 66 Mica. L. 
REv. 1347 (1968); Seeburger &: Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 
29 U. PITT. L. R.Ev. 1 (1967); Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of 
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). For a critical analysis of equally fervent claims 
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mittee's general commentary is devoted to this question, and since 
this commentary is the most thorough version of arguments that have 
been presented elsewhere,230 it will be the focus of attention here. 
A. The ABA Case for "Need" 
After setting forth some twenty pages on the evils of organized 
crime, the Advisory Committee concedes that statistics are "wanting" 
to prove the need for electronic surveillance as a technique in attack-
ing this problem. The Committee then asserts that "[ d]ecision here 
. . . must rest on the sort of 'pragmatic evidence' that is not 'want-
ing.' "231 Then follow a summary statement of the information 
obtained from a bug that was apparently in continuous operation for 
over three years232 and a description of the Berger investigation, in 
which bugging of course played a large part. Recognizing that at 
most these two cases prove utility and not indispensability, the Com-
mittee then discusses the shortcomings of what has heretofore been 
one of the principal methods of investigating organized crime, the 
use of informers. According to the Committee, informants can pro-
vide only fragmentary data and are often unreliable and afraid of 
reprisals; moreover, grants of immunity from prosecution may 
result merely in defiance or perjury. For reasons that are not made 
clear, the Committee asserts that such informants can do nothing to 
prevent crime but rather are useful only to solve crimes that have 
already been committed.233 
Supposedly because of these difficulties, according to the ABA, 
no law enforcement office other than that of New York County Dis-
trict Attorney Frank Hogan has been very successful in fighting or-
ganized crime. Since former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has 
of necessity with respect to investigative arrests, attacks on Mapp v. Ohio, and on 
Mallory v. United States, see Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented 
Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 446-71 (1964). 
230. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097 passim; Brief for National District Attorneys' As-
sociation, in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), reprinted in Hearings Before 
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1055-142 
(1967). 
231. ABA STANDARDS 54. The approach is reminiscent of Professor Fred E. Inbau's 
claim when attacking the McNabb-Mallory rule: "I cannot answer the ••• point with 
any statistics of my own ••• but some simple logic is available to support the propo-
sition that the McNabb-Mallory rule does, and is bound to have, a crippling effect 
upon law enforcement •.•• " More About Public Safety v. Individual Liberties, 53 
J. CRIM. L.C.8:P.S. 329, 331 (1962). Professor Kamisar's article, supra note 229, shows 
how unreliable "simple logic" can be, as do many of the studies of the impact of 
Miranda v. Arizona; see, e.g., sources cited in note 229 supra. 
232. ABA STANDARDS 54. 
233. But cf. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). 
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frequently denied the indispensability of electronic eavesdropping,234' 
the Advisory Committee takes special pains to show that the Justice 
Department's effort has "not been a success. The alternative to sur-
veillance has, in short, been tried and found wanting."285 This general 
conclusion is buttressed by conclusions from the English Privy 
Councillors' Report in 1957,236 the National Crime Commission 
Report, 237 and other studies. 
B. Analysis of the Case for Need 
The section dealing with the indespensability of electronic sur-
veillance is by far the weakest part of the ABA tentative draft. Vv e 
are not given the balanced analysis one might have expected from 
such a blue ribbon group as the ABA Advisory Committee, particu-
larly in view of the quality of other ABA reports in the criminal 
justice area; rather, we are presented with a one-sided brief, full of 
half-truths and bootstrapping. For example, the commentary relies 
heavily on "the two most comprehensive studies undertaken of 
electronic surveillance: the report of the English Privy Councillors 
in 1957 and the recent report of the President's [Crime] Commis-
sion .... "238 The first work is cited and quoted frequently in the 
draft and elsewhere, 239 yet nowhere is it even mentioned that of the 
three Privy Councillors who compiled the Report, one dissented 
and called for restrictions so severe that "interception would prac-
tically cease to be used" for detection of crime.24° Citations to the 
Crime Commission Report involve a substantial element of boot-
strapping, for the ABA Advisory Committee Reporter was the 
chief consultant on electronic surveillance for the Crime Commis-
sion. Thus, the Advisory Committee quotes a statement that "elec-
tronic surveillance techniques ·were termed 'the tools' " in fighting 
234. See, e.g., 1967 Long Subcommittee Hearings 48. 
235. ABA STANDARDS 77. 
236. REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE To INQUIRE INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICA.• 
TIONS, Cmnd. No. 283 (1957). 
237. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jusna:, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). 
238. ABA STANDARDS 78. 
239. See, e.g., Berger Brief, supra note 230, at 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47. 
240. REPORT, supra note 236, at 38, 1f 170 (dissent of P.C. Gordon Walker). Incl• 
dentally, the results of the majority Privy Councillors' approach, and perhaps a 
forecast of what may befall us, were reported recently under the headline: "Britons 
live among army of snoopers." The article stated that a recent report by a Com• 
mittee for the Public Protection of Privacy found that "Scotland Yard has 25 lines 
which can be used for intercepting phone calls within a radius of 100 miles. The 
general post office [which operates the phone system] has 40 wiretap officers on full• 
time duty, and another 30 snoopers attached by other agencies •••• Britain's intelli-
gence • • • operate 400-plus wiretaps throughout the country." The Detroit News, 
Sept. 18, 1968, at 1-F, col. I. 
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organized crime, 241 but it fails to reveal that the statement was made 
by the ABA Reporter himself in a research paper prepared for the 
Crime Commission's Task Force on Organized Crime.242 
The analysis of relative success in combatting organized crime of 
those jurisdictions with and without eavesdropping authority is 
especially one-sided. New York is said to be the only jurisdiction 
which has been successful in fighting organized crime, allegedly 
because of its use of electronic eavesdropping.243 At most, this would 
prove only that New York has used this weapon effectively and not 
that the state could not have done the job equally well without it. 
It is obviously impossible to know whether New York could continue 
its success in this area without electronic eavesdropping for it has 
never had to try-its organized crime investigations have been built 
around such techniques for almost thirty-five years. 
Second, has New York really been so successful? Some of orga-
nized crime's most powerful years in New York were during the 
1940's2H when the New York police tapped without any inhibitions, 
and New York is still the center of organized crime.245 Since this objec-
tion has been made frequently, the ABA Committee and the Crime 
Commission both respond with the comment that Mr. Hogan's office 
has lacked resources and manpower to do more.246 Yet, the New York 
County District Attorney's Office is one of the largest and best 
equipped in the nation, with over a hundred lawyers, ten special in-
vestigators, approximately six accountants, and seventy-five elite 
police officers permanently assigned to it.247 In addition, it is backed 
by a 28,000-man police force which has laboratories and other modern 
facilities; the New York State Intelligence and Information Service 
with its electronic computers; and the cooperation, when necessary, 
241. ABA STANDARDS 75-76. 
242. TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 95. The technique is reminiscent of 
that used by former Narcotics Commissioner Harry Anslinger to build up the mari-
juana phobia. See Skolnick, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 
S. CAL, L. R.Ev. 588, 598-601 (1968). 
243. ABA STANDARDS 75, citing THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra 
note 237, at 201. 
244. The famous conversation between Frank Costello and Judge Thomas Aurelio, 
ABA STANDARDS 41, occurred in the 1940's. THE KEFAUVER REPORT ON ORGANIZED 
CRIME 102-05 (Didier ed. 1951). On organized crime in the 1940's see generally id. 
245. Eighty percent of all Cosa Nostra members are said to live in the New Jersey-
New York area or in Chicago. Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Government 
Operations on the Federal Effort Against Organized Crime, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 48 
(1967) (testimony of Fred M. Vinson, Jr.). 
246. ABA STANDARDS 76, citing THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra 
note 237, at 202, as authority. 
247. Mayer, Hogan's Office Is a Kind of Ministry of Justice, N.Y. Times, July 23, 
1967, § 6 (M'agazine) at 7, col. 1. 
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of the district attorneys of the four other counties that comprise 
New York City, to say nothing of the potential assistance of police 
and prosecutors outside of the city. How large a law enforcement 
establishment must a free society support in order to deal with this 
problem if one of the largest and best prosecutorial offices in the 
nation cannot do an adequate job even with electronic eavesdropping 
powers? 
Moreover, even the evidence cited by the ABA undermines the 
claim that New York is the only jurisdiction in the country that has 
achieved success in this area. Both the ABA commentary and the 
Crime Commission Report praise Chicago, which operates under one 
of the stiffest anti-eavesdropping laws in the nation, as having one of 
the best programs aimed at organized crime.248 The Los Angeles 
police department, which has been forced to operate without elec-
tronic eavesdropping authority in recent years, was also rated 
highly.249 Both departments have of course asked for eavesdropping 
authority250-although leading law enforcement authorities in both 
states have denied its indispensability-but such requests are hardly 
surprising given today's atmosphere. 
Indeed, the Crime Commission Report, carefully analyzed, does 
not say that only New York has had success but rather that only New 
York has had "continuous success."251 It is unlikely that the unique-
ness of this continuity resulted primarily from the use of electronic 
eavesdropping. Rather, a good part of the answer is that other cities 
have had a rapid turnover of district attorneys, many of whom have 
had a distinct lack of interest in fighting organized crime.252 In New 
York, on the other hand, Frank Hogan and his predecessor, Thomas 
Dewey, have been in office for almost thirty-four years, and both 
have continuously given top priority to fighting organized crime. 
Indeed, as Samuel Dash and his colleagues discovered, and as Pro-
fessor Westin has recently confirmed,253 many other cities have ac-
tually used wiretapping for crime detection, albeit illegally, and yet 
they did not achieve the "continuous success" that New York has 
supposedly enjoyed. 
248. ABA STANDARDS 25, citing TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME at 12-14 
nn.110, 111, 114. 
249. TASK FORCE REPORT 12-14. 
250. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 567-72 (testimony of Orlando Wilson); TASK 
FORCE REPORT 13-14 n.114 (Chicago); id. at 12 n.110 (Los Angeles). 
251. TASK FORCE REPORT 201 (emphasis added). 
252. See Ruth, supra note 226, and TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 13. 
253. See generally s. DASH, R. KNOWLTON&: R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS. 
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Perhaps the weakest link in the ABA Committee's whole argu-
ment is the denigration of the federal effort. The Advisory Com-
mittee summarizes its dissatisfaction by complaining that the De-
partment of Justice, with all its investigative resources-save eaves-
dropping since 1967-has been able to convict only 102 out of 5,000 
Casa Nostra members. Informants are ineffective, tax cases are 
becoming too difficult to make, immunity statutes are inadequate. In 
short, without electronic surveillance little can be accomplished, 
and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who ordered an end 
to federal eavesdropping in June 1967,254 was apparently too un-
informed or too indifferent about fighting organized crime. 
The facts, however, simply do not support this argument. In the 
first place, one obviously cannot blame any pre-1967 ineffectiveness 
on the lack of eavesdropping authority ( or on Ramsey Clark for 
that matter), for federal authorities eavesdropped extensively until 
then, as has been mentioned. Moreover, the situation today does 
not support the charge of inevitable inadequacy. Apart from the fact 
that the file cards of the Justice Department's Criminal Division 
list only some two thousand Casa Nostra members,255 a Justice 
Department report in September 1968, the first since the Depart-
ment began to implement Clark's "strike force" approach, shows 
quite a significant increase in such prosecutions and convictions.256 
The 1968 annual report of the FBI claims equal success, including, 
just in this one year, an impressive number of convictions of persons 
who seem to be quite important in organized crime;257 since these 
254. PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 126-30. 
255. Hearings, supra note 245, at 24. 
256. Press Release, Department of Justice, Sept. 4, 1968: "Of 210 known or suspected 
members of La Cosa Nostra indicted or convicted during the past 13 years, 48 were 
indicted or convicted during fiscal 1968.'" Congressional budget-cutting has recently 
been said to threaten this effort; see Fight on Organized Crime Gains, but Tight 
Budget Hurts, Ann Arbor News, Nov. 17, 1968, at 1, col. 4. 
257. FBI ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1968 3-4 (1968): 
For the FBI [the 1968 fiscal year] was a year of striking accomplishment against 
the bulwark of the hoodlum criminal conspiracy-La Cosa Nostra. Clearly 
evidencing ever deeper penetration into the organized crime network in the past 
few years, FBI probes netted the convictions of 281 hoodlum, gambling and vice 
figures for violations within the Bureau's jurisdiction-a dramatic increase over 
the previous record total of 197 convicted during the preceding fiscal year. 
Although there is some skepticism about FBI figures in some quarters (See Kohl-
meier, Hoover Loses Immunity to Criticism Despite "Law-and-Order" Mood, Wall 
St. J., Oct. 10, 1968, at 1, col. 6 at 14, col. 1.), the Standards of course show little of this 
skepticism. 
The Bureau has even been able to move against Stefano Magaddino (see Spieler, 
Magaddino: Mobster or a Loving Father?, Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, Nov. 30, 
1968, at lA, col. 4), whom Professor Blakey recently singled out as someone whom 
the federal government was not able to indict because of its lack of eavesdropping 
powers. 1967 Long Committee Hearings 962. 
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reports there have been additional successes.258 Indeed, this federal 
effort has been so successful that President Nixon's "main congres-
sional advisers on crime," the House Republican Task Force on 
Crime, overcame its customary hostility to Ramsey Clark and recom-
mended not only that his coordinated strike forces be "expanded," 
but that electronic surveillance "should be utilized on an extremely 
selective and carefully controlled basis," with bugging used espe-
cially rarely.259 
The ABA Committee makes dire predictions that even the 
"unsuccessful" federal performance will get worse, for many federal 
prosecutions are in tax cases, and these are getting harder to make 
as criminals increase the amount of earnings they report.260 Here, 
too, the facts seem otherwise: an IRS spokesman told Congress in 
1967 that tax convictions were increasing,261 and the increase in 
arrests and convictions recently reported bear him out.262 
Perhaps the federal effort is not yet a "success." It may never 
be-"success" is an ambiguous term. After all, how many more con-
victions of the high-level officials of organized crime could one ever 
obtain, even with every investigative resource possible, given the 
inevitable problems of detection and proof in such cases? But if the 
comparison is made with prior years or other jurisdictions, it is 
hard to call the federal drive against organized crime-which 
started in 1959, moved into high gear only when Robert F. Kennedy 
became Attorney General, and is just beginning to pay off-not a 
"success." 
The arguments against the indispensability of eavesdropping 
authority are reinforced by the fact that many career law enforce-
ment officers apparently do not consider this power essential. These 
include former Attorney General Stanley Mask of California263 
(now a justice of that state's supreme court), former Cook County, 
Illinois, State's Attorney Dan Ward,264 former Detroit Police Com-
258. E.g., Fox, U.S. Anticrime Force in Brooklyn Strikes Again, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
20, 1968, at 31, col. 3. 
259. Graham, Nixon Is Given Plan To Combat Crime, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1968, 
p. 1, col. 8. The intensity and success of the federal effort is also considered one of 
the main reasons why American criminals are moving into English gambling. Wall 
St. J., Nov. 8, 1968, at 1, col. l. 
Attorney General John Mitchell has not, however, indicated any great reluctance to 
use the powers given him by title III. See Graham, Mitchell To Use Wiretap Powers in 
Fight on Crime, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 4. 
260. ABA STANDARDS 77. 
261. Hearings, supra note 245, at 108 (testimony of William Kolar). 
262. See text accompanying notes 256-58 supra. 
263. 1961 Senate Hearings 545. 
264. Id. at 400. 
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missioner Ray Girardin,265 Senator Thomas Eagleton of Mis-
souri,266 former Attorney General Thomas McBride of Pennsyl-
vania, 267 former Philadelphia District Attorney Samuel Dash, and 
many others. Judge Isadore Dollinger, former Bronx District Attor-
ney, recently commented that even with respect to investigations of 
gambling-the "lifeblood" of organized crime and the area where 
most eavesdropping takes place-wiretapping is not of much use.268 
One federal prosecutor told a Wall Street Journal reporter: "All 
this bugging flap and most of the time we got nothing."269 Indeed, 
even]. Edgar Hoover once called electronic eavesdropping "a handi-
cap to the development of sound investigational technique,"270 
although today this "handicap" has apparently been overcome, at 
least in Mr. Hoover's eyes. 
Even if electronic eavesdropping were as vital to the fight against 
organized crime as its most ardent proponents claim, its legitimation 
by the Crime Control Act would still not be "successful" in remov-
ing organized crime as a force in American life. At most, as is evident 
from the experience in New York, a few more criminals may be 
convicted in other cities and places. But even this result is unlikely, 
for, as most specialists on organized crime will readily agree, there 
are other basic and perhaps insuperable problems: public apathy; 
police corruption,271 perhaps fostered by poor police salaries and 
training; light sentences in gambling cases; a lack of coordinated 
intelligence and other cooperation between enforcement agencies;272 
265. See letter of March 3, 1967, to the author, quoted in 1967 Long Committee 
Hearings 405. 
266. 1961 Senate Hearings 554-55. 
267. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, 25 (1958). 
268. Zion, Dollinger Is Favored in Bronx, But Calandra Stays Optimistic, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 2, 1967, at 36, col. 2, 3. 
269. Landauer, Agents' Eavesdropping Hurts U.S. Campaign Against Racketeering, 
Wall St. J., March 6, 1967, p. I, col. I, p. II, col. 2. In Olmstead itself [Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927)], the now disavowed grandfather of all the wire-
tapping and bugging cases, the jury foreman stated that "the telephone conversations 
virtually were disregarded." Quoted in ·w. MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL: A CASE 
STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 45 (1965). 
270. Quoted in Note, Wiretapping and Law Enforcement, 31 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870 
n.5!1 (1940). 
271. See Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 
Search Warrants and Organized Crime: A Policy Statement, (32 pages of unnumbered 
text) (1966): "[T]he most obvious expense of organized crime is the purchase of pro-
tection and • • • the primary agency to be corrupted by such purchase is the local 
police." See also Smith, The Mob: You Can't Expect Police on the Take To Take 
Orders, LIFE MAGAZINE, Dec. 6, 1968, at 40. 
272. See 1961 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION ON SYNDI· 
CATED G.umUNG 100-10; Gardner, supra note 226; Kamisar, Comment, ABA SECTION OF 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND REsl'ONSIBIUTIES MONOGRAPH No. 1, 37 (1967); Ruth, supra note 
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and a fear of implicating highly placed political or business figures 
and other community leaders who often work with and protect 
major organized-crime leaders. The Crime Commission's Task Force 
on Organized Crime found that very few police departments and 
prosecutors' offices even had special units in this area.273 Thus, few 
prosecutors are really interested in attacking organized crime for 
such investigations may touch very powerful officials on whom an 
elected prosecutor must depend and with whom he must work.274 
Surely the dangerous and quite uncontrolled eavesdropping power 
of title III should not be entrusted to men who are likely to use it 
not for the allegedly limited and grave purpose for which it was 
created, but rather, for more trivial matters. In making this grant of 
sweeping power, are we not authorizing use of a very dangerous 
drug to treat the common cold? Indeed, this loose legislation, with 
its extensive list of offenses that can be investigated by eavesdrop-
ping even though they have no substantial or even ostensible con-
nection with organized crime, actually encourages such indiscrimi-
nate use. 
What then can be done to combat organized crime? Even if 
eavesdropping is merely useful and not indispensable to this effort, 
should we not at least grant the authority to employ electronic sur-
veillance to those who will actually use it against this troublesome 
force in our community? How many weapons can we take away 
from our law enforcement officers and still leave them with effective 
tools? Perhaps the only real answer here, as in so many of society's 
other crime problems, is that effective law enforcement is really not 
the first line of defense against crime or even a very significant 
aspect of crime control. In a free society, forcible repression rarely 
brings about a lasting solution to a social problem, though it may 
be othenvise in a totalitarian state. Other solutions must be sought 
which strike at the social and economic structure out of which 
226. Problems of cooperation often exist within the federal establishment, although the 
Justice Department's strike force technique has apparently been quite successful. See notes 
257-58 supra; Calame 8e Steiger, State, Federal Officials Team Up To Intensify Drive 
Against Crime, Wall St. J. May 15, 1968, at I, col. 6; Kohlmeier, supra note 257 
("The FBI has refused to assign its agents to strike forces. And in the Justice 
Department there are strong feelings that Mr. Hoover's independence is rendering the 
effort far less effective than it could be."). 
273. TASK FORCE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 12. 
274. See, e.g., the problems for the Hudson County prosecutor which arose when 
a Congressman with ties to the local county leader was charged with being involved 
with organized crime. Sullivan, Hudson Prosecutor Investigating Charges Against 
Gallagher, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1968, at 41, col. 3; Smith, supra note 271. 
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specific types of crime arise. Thomas Schelling has observed, in a 
Crime Commission research paper which that body seems to have 
ignored, that criminals who provide illegal services depend upon 
an absence of legitimate competition.275 Effective prohibition and 
law enforcement against potential legitimate or illegitimate com-
petitors reinforce the criminal's illicit monopoly and keep the 
monopoly returns high. When he loses the monopoly, he quits. 
Organized crime abandoned the liquor industry after Prohibition 
was repealed because it was "rather swamped . . . with competi-
tion,"276 not because of the extensive law enforcement effort. There-
fore, one solution may be selective "decriminalization" in areas such 
as gambling, a proposal which was concurred in recently by an IRS 
spokesman.277 As Professor Norval Morris has said with respect to 
gambling: "It seems to me late in the day for us to be further delay-
ing removal of the major financing of organized crime in this coun-
try. . .. There is no evidence whatsoever that gambling legislation 
reduces the incidence of gambling and virtually nobody believes that 
it does .... Have we got to continue this charade?"278 The practical-
ity of this approach can be seen in Nevada, for example, where the 
entry of Howard Hughes and other legitimate operators into the 
gambling business seems to be driving the criminal element out.279 
Loan sharking, another principal source of revenue for organized 
crime might be reduced if we directly confronted the problem of pro-
viding legitimate sources of capital for hard-pressed debtors, although 
this may be quite difficult where very poor risks are involved. Simi-
larly, the ABA Advisory Committee deplores the drug addict's misery 
and the terrible cost that his crime inflicts upon society. Yet, para-
doxically but inevitably, stringent enforcement of the narcotics laws 
worsens the addict's life and increases his criminal activity by driv-
ing the supply of drugs down and the price up. In all the service 
areas where organized crime thrives, decriminalization or legitimate 
275. Schelling, Economic Analysis and Organized Crime, TASK FORCE REPORT app. 
D 114, 116-17. 
276. Id. at 124. 
277. Hearings, supra note 245, at 70 (testimony of William Kolar). See also Kadish, 
The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967). 
278. Morris, Politics and Pragmatism in Crime Control, FED. PROBATION, June 
1968, 9, 14. 
279. Lehman, Crime, The Public, and the Crime Commission: A. Critical Review 
of the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1487, 1536-37 (1968). 
Professor Lehman also points to the exodus of the criminal element from bars which 
cater to homosexuals as reduced police harassment of such places encourages legiti-
mate businesses to enter. Id. at 1536. 
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competition might well do far more good280 than giving prosecu-
tors dangerous weapons to fight a war that very few want to enter 
and none can win. 
An approach which tries to substitute decriminalization for re-
pression requires rationality and patience. Moreover, the law en-
forcement job that inevitably remains calls for substantial training 
and other expenditures and a willingness to cooperate by jeal-
ously independent entities like the FBI, the Treasury Department, 
and local governmental agencies.281 In contrast, electronic eaves-
dropping seems "so easy"; as Ramsey Clark has noted: "[I]t doesn't 
cost anything in the sense that it would cost something to increase 
police salaries .... It's something that can be done with the words 
of the law .... "282 
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the vices of a one-sided presentation of important issues 
is that responsive criticism inevitably appears equally one-sided. 
Thus, a few caveats are in order when considering the ABA Stan-
dards and title III. 
The foregoing discussion is not meant to argue that electronic 
eavesdropping is of little or no use in fighting organized crime. 
As the ABA Committee correctly says, it is probably true that no 
convincing demonstration can be made either way. The purpose 
here has been to show only that there is a very strong doubt about 
the need for eavesdropping, that the argument in support of eaves-
dropping authority is quite vulnerable to critical analysis. On the 
other hand, the evidence clearly indicates that the electronic sur-
veillance permitted by title III and the Standards will result in an 
inherently intensive, widespread, and unavoidable encroachment on 
some of our most necessary rights. As proponents of this new author-
ity admit-indeed, proclaim-eavesdropping's great value is to pro-
vide strategic intelligence; but searching for such intelligence cannot 
be reconciled either with the fourth amendment (and perhaps the 
first as well) or with title Ill's ostensible limitation to specific crimes. 
The burden on those who would justify eavesdropping's far-reaching 
280. Morris, supra note 278, at 14. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL SANCTION (1967). 
281. See note 272 supra. 
282. Clark, Transcript of speaking Freely, WNBC Television, May 12, 1968, at 
29-30. 
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intrusion upon individual liberty is very great. On the record pre-
sented by the ABA Committee, this burden has simply not been met. 
Title III is an invitation to widespread eavesdropping and the 
ABA Tentative Draft is little better. This should not have been 
unexpected this year, or perhaps any year. Indeed, in one sense, these 
times are not so unique. We have always had crime scares of one 
kind or another-either domestic crime or international espionage 
or internal subversion-and our legislatures have always been espe-
cially susceptible to this kind of pressure. It is for this reason that 
the call for legislative solutions to crime problems283 usually ensures 
an antilibertarian result. It is difficult to find very much recent 
criminal legislation which is not repressive and law-enforcement-
oriented, except perhaps for the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966.284 
Almost no legislation, state or federal, has restricted police officers. 
As our domestic cauldron continues to seethe, as young people, 
angry, frustrated, and disenchanted, account for an increasing share 
of our population and inevitably raise crime rates, as riots and dis-
orders continue in part because men like Senators McClellan, East-
land, Dirksen, and others block social reform-as all these forces 
persist, legislative action is likely to become more and more reaction-
ary and repressive. This Article was written in the midst of the 1968 
election campaign, when the primary concern of much of the elec-
torate seemed to focus on the slogan "law and order"; how the new 
Administration reacts may well determine how much domestic tran-
quility we will have. 
Our best hope for maintaining and furthering individual liberty 
lies with the courts, and particularly with the Supreme Court, since 
it has at least some insulation from popular hysteria, and a special 
concern for liberty. It cannot do everything of course, as the Chief 
Justice somewhat poignantly acknowledged recently,285 especially 
in a time of crisis. Indeed, lately the Court has seemed to draw back 
from a strong libertarian position.286 The defeat of President John-
son's nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice-motivated as 
it was primarily by resentment toward the Court for its attempts at 
283. See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. 
L. REv. 929 (1965). 
284. 18 U.S.C. § 3146-52 (Supp. III, 1967), 80 Stat. 21. 
285. Terry v. Ohio, 389 U.S. I, 13-14 (1967). 
286. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Walker v. Birmingham, 388 
U.S. 307 (1967); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Steel, Nine Men in Black Who 
Think White, N.Y. Times, Oct, 13, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 56, col. 1. 
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enhancing individual liberty-may make the Justices even more 
gun-shy. But if we must rely on legislative solutions to these prob-
lems, we are indeed in a bad way; the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 may well be symptomatic of what we can 
expect. 
